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Corporations and the Original Meaning of 
“Citizens” in Article III 
MARK MOLLER† AND LAWRENCE B. SOLUM† 
Article III confers the judicial power of the United States over controversies between 
“citizens” of different states. In Section 1332(c) of Title 28 of the United States Code, 
Congress has provided that for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction, corporations are citizens 
of the state in which they are incorporated and the state in which their principal place of 
business is located. This raises the question whether corporations are citizens within the 
original public meaning of Article III of the Constitution. This Article demonstrates that in 
1787 the word “citizen” referred only to natural persons and therefore that corporations 
cannot be considered “citizens” within the original public meaning of Article III. As a 
consequence, insofar as Congress purports to confer constitutional citizenship on 
corporations, Section 1332(c) is unconstitutional from an originalist perspective. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Just before his death in 1875, Benjamin Curtis, the great Dred Scott 
dissenter, lectured Harvard law students on “one of the most . . . difficult 
questions on the subject of parties”: “jurisdiction over corporations.”1 
In the preceding decades, the Supreme Court had extended diversity 
jurisdiction over corporate parties.2 Yet, noted Curtis, “[i]t has been from first 
to last admitted that corporations are not citizens” within the meaning of Article 
III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause (or any other provision of the 
Constitution).3 As a work around, the Marshall Court, in Bank of United States 
v. Deveaux, had held that parties suing corporations could rely on the diverse 
state citizenship of corporate shareholders.4 To defang the bite of the complete 
diversity requirement, the Taney Court later adopted a conclusive presumption 
that shareholders are citizens of a single state—the one that created the 
corporation.5  
That presumption, Curtis told his students, is a “falsehood”—identical to 
the infamous fictions that the Court of the King’s Bench had used to expand its 
jurisdiction vis-a-vis Common Pleas centuries earlier.6 However, he cautioned, 
“there is not the slightest reason to suppose it will ever be departed from by the 
court.”7 
Despite a post-Hobby Lobby surge of scholarly interest in corporate 
constitutional rights, originalists have not paid much attention to the corporate 
right to diversity jurisdiction that so perplexed Justice Curtis. The omission begs 
to be rectified. Corporate diversity jurisdiction is, after all, among the oldest, 
most practically important, and frequently utilized of corporate constitutional 
rights. It is, most recently, the foundation for sweeping expansions of federal 
power over corporate litigation in the Class Action Fairness Act.8 What does 
originalism mean for corporations’ continued access to the federal diversity 
docket and all that comes with it?  
The Article begins to answer that question by investigating the original 
 
 1. This lecture, part of a series of lectures on federal jurisdiction, was posthumously published in 1880. 
See BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, JURISDICTION, PRACTICE, AND PECULIAR JURISPRUDENCE OF THE COURTS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 127 (George Ticknor Curtis & Benjamin R. Curtis eds., 1880). 
 2. Id. at 129–33.  
 3. Id. at 128. Indeed, “it may fairly be said that neither the framers of the Constitution nor framers of the 
Judiciary Act had corporations in view” when they authorized federal courts to hear “controversies between 
citizens of different states.” Id. at 128; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 4. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 129–32. The case is Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). 
 5. Id. at 132–33. The case that adopted this presumption is Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 57 U.S. 
314 (1853). In a prior case, Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844), the Court 
allowed the corporation to claim the state that was simultaneously its state of incorporation and the place it 
conducts its business as its state of citizenship on two rationales—a narrower holding that allowed the 
corporation to borrow the citizenship of shareholders who were citizens of that state, and a broader holding that 
suggested the corporation itself was a citizen of that state, without regard to the citizenship of any of its members. 
43 U.S. at 554–57 (narrower holding); id. at 557–58 (broader holding); see also Michael Collins & Ann 
Woolhandler, Judicial Federalism Under Marshall and Taney, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 337, 347–51, 362–65 (2018). 
 6. CURTIS, supra note 1, at 130–32. 
 7. Id. at 133. 
 8. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in various sections of 28 
U.S.C.). 
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public meaning of “citizens” in Article III of the United States Constitution. 
We say “begins,” because assessing the scope of diversity jurisdiction over 
corporations requires answering not one but two questions. The first is whether 
corporations, considered as abstract legal “persons” with an identity separate 
from their shareholders, are state “citizens” within the meaning of Article III—
the proposition Curtis said had “from first to last” been rejected. The second is 
whether corporations, if not themselves citizens, can rely on the diverse 
citizenship of the natural persons who “own” the corporation (the shareholders), 
the route pursued in Deveaux and other antebellum cases reviewed by Curtis.  
This Article is limited to the first question—were corporations “citizens” 
within the original meaning of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause? This 
question requires its own article because it ranges across multiple provisions, 
each ratified at different times. 
One, of course, is Article III’s Diversity of Citizenship Clause itself, 
ratified in 1788. It provides: “The judicial power shall extend . . . to 
controversies . . . between citizens of different states.”9 
However, the Article III term we are concerned with, “citizen,” was 
modified after the Civil War by the Fourteenth Amendment.10 In Dred Scott v. 
Sandford, the Taney Court held that African Americans were not “citizens 
of . . . [a] state[]” within the meaning of the Article III Diversity Clause or the 
Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause.11 The Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Citizenship Clause overturned Dred Scott by supplying a master definition of 
citizen applicable to both of these clauses. 
The upshot is that determining whether corporations are citizens for Article 
III purposes requires an inquiry into the meaning of “citizen” not just at the close 
of the eighteenth century, when Article III was adopted; but in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. 
We will take each period in turn. Below, we will show that at the end of 
the 1780s, the exact meaning of “citizen” was contested. But the word 
communicated at least one agreed upon piece of information to ordinary 
Americans: namely, that a person was a proper object of an expectation of 
allegiance to a political community, implied from the nature of the person’s 
connection to the relevant state. Because, in turn, allegiance was an “affective” 
bond—a moral “sentiment” characteristic only of natural persons—“citizen” at 
the close of the eighteenth century was a status that was conceptually and 
linguistically limited to natural persons. This limitation, we show, was 
pervasively reflected in period usage. Corporations were therefore not textual 
diversity citizens when the Diversity Clause was ratified. 
 
 9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 10. An earlier modification came through the 1795 ratification of the Eleventh Amendment. A response to 
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), this amendment withdraws Article III jurisdiction over controversies 
between states, on one hand, and citizens of another state or foreign citizens, on the other. Because it does not 
directly affect the grant of jurisdiction over controversies confined to citizens of different states, this amendment 
is not our immediate focus. But because it is practically contemporaneous with ratification of Article III, our 
evidence about late eighteenth-century usage applies to its use of “citizen,” in any event.  
 11. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405–27 (1857). 
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Next, we turn to the 1860s. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship 
Clause offered what the original Constitution had lacked—a master definition 
of “citizens”: “All persons” “born or naturalized in” and “subject to the 
jurisdiction” of the United States are citizens of the United States and of the state 
in which they reside. In 1868, we will show, “born” and “naturalized” “citizens” 
were terms limited to natural persons. As a result, the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
definition continued to confine “citizen” to natural persons—while clarifying 
that the term was open without regard to one arbitrary characteristic of natural 
persons, their race. Corporations were not citizens in the 1780s and did not 
become so through the Fourteenth Amendment.12 
Here is the road map for our argument. Part I briefly outlines our approach, 
“public meaning originalism.” Part II lays the groundwork for our historical 
investigation by identifying the nature of the word “citizen” as a “sortal” and 
reflecting on the theoretical challenges facing our attempt to recover its original 
meaning. Part III makes the case that corporations cannot be “citizens” as that 
term was understood by the public in the initial framing period. Part IV shows 
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause continued to define 
citizenship as a status unique to natural persons. We end with a conclusion that 
restates our thesis and identifies additional issues that must be resolved in order 
to formulate an originalist doctrine regarding corporate diversity jurisdiction. 
I.  PUBLIC MEANING ORIGINALISM 
The theoretical framework for our inquiry is provided by “public meaning 
originalism”—a member of the originalist family of constitutional theories. In 
this Part of the Article, we outline our theoretical perspective by reviewing the 
key foundational ideas of public meaning originalism. In addition, we briefly 
outline the role that original public meaning can play in nonoriginalist 
constitutional theories such as constitutional pluralism. 
 
 12. The words “citizen” and “citizens” appear elsewhere in the Constitution. In Article III, the word 
“citizens” appears five times other than the Diversity of Citizenship Clause, corresponding to the other distinct 
forms of subject-matter jurisdiction involving “citizens”: (1) state-citizen diversity jurisdiction, (2) land grant 
jurisdiction, (3) state-foreign citizen jurisdiction, (4) United States citizen-foreign state jurisdiction, and (5) 
United States citizen-foreign citizen jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. It also appears in the practically 
contemporaneous Eleventh Amendment See supra note 10 and accompanying text. In addition, “citizen” or 
“citizens” appear in Article I’s specifications of the qualifications for members of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, Article II’s specification of qualifications for the President, as well as the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of Article IV and the Citizenship Clause and the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5; id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Finally, “citizens” appears in voting rights provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Fifteenth Amendment, Nineteenth Amendment, Twenty-Fourth Amendment, and the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 1; id. amend. XIX, § 1; id. amend. 
XXIV, § 1; id. amend. XXVI, § 1. The focus of this Article is on the original public meaning of “citizen” in the 
context of the Diversity of Citizenship Clause of Article III, but our findings extend to the other occurrences of 
“citizens” in Article III, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment. The original public meaning 
of “citizen” and “citizens” elsewhere in the Constitution may well be identical to what we describe herein, but 
that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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A.  THE ORIGINALIST FAMILY OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES 
Originalism is best viewed as a family of constitutional theories, almost all 
of which affirm two ideas: 
The Fixation Thesis: The communicative content of the constitutional text is 
fixed at the time each constitutional provision is framed and ratified. 
The Constraint Principle: The legal content of constitutional doctrines and the 
decision of constitutional cases should, at a minimum, be consistent with and 
fairly derivable from the communicative content of the constitutional text. 
These statements are intended to be precise and they are stated using 
technical terms, but the intuitive ideas behind the Fixation Thesis and the 
Constraint Principle are simple. The Fixation Thesis expresses the common-
sense idea that the linguistic meaning of a writing is fixed at the time it is 
authored: even though the words and phrases may acquire new meanings at a 
later time because of linguistic drift.13 The Fixation Thesis pins original meaning 
to the point in time when a constitutional provision was framed and ratified: 
Article III and the rest of the unamended Constitution was drafted in 1787 and 
the ratification process became effective in 1788;14 the public meaning of Article 
III was fixed during that period. The Constraint Principle summarizes the idea 
that the constitutional text is binding: judges may not adopt constitutional 
constructions that are constitutional amendments in disguise.15 As applied to 
Article III diversity jurisdiction, the Constraint Principle would require that 
constitutional doctrine be made consistent with the original meaning of 
“citizen,” which, as we shall demonstrate, does not include corporations. 
Almost all originalists agree on fixation and constraint, but there are 
disagreements about other topics. The most significant area of disagreement 
concerns the nature of original meaning. Although public meaning originalism 
is the predominant view, original intentions originalism,16 original methods 
originalism,17 and original law originalism also have adherents. Our 
 
 13. The case for the Fixation Thesis is stated in Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of 
Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2015). 
 14. On June 21, 1788, New Hampshire ratified the Constitution, satisfying the Article VII threshold of nine 
states. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 
(2001). 
 15. A defense of the Constraint Principle is provided in Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: 
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice (Apr. 3, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2940215. 
 16. See Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three 
Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226 (1988); Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That 
English You’re Speaking?” Why Intention Free Interpretation Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 
969 (2004) (“Full blooded intentionalists consider all available evidence of the actual author’s intended 
meaning.”). An important variation of original intentions originalism (the “new intentionalism”) emphasizes the 
communicative intentions of the Framers. See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE 
OF ORIGINALISM 87 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011); see also Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Legislative 
Intentions, Legislative Supremacy, and Legal Positivism, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 510 n.57 (2005); John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 72 n.7 (2006). 
 17. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 765–72 (2009); see also John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitution and the Language of the Law, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1321, 1332 (2018) (explicating the language-of-the-law thesis as part of Original Methods Originalism). 
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investigation of “citizens” relies on public meaning originalism, although much 
of the evidence that we present could also be used to reach similar conclusions 
from the perspective of alternative versions of originalism. 
B.  THE INTERPRETATION-CONSTRUCTION DISTINCTION 
Public meaning originalism can and should affirm the interpretation-
construction distinction,18 which can be summarized as follows: 
Constitutional Interpretation is stipulated to be the activity that discerns the 
meaning (understood as communicative content conveyed by linguistic 
meaning in context) of the constitutional text. 
Constitutional Construction is stipulated to be the activity that determines the 
legal effect (including the decision of constitutional cases and the specification 
of constitutional doctrines) given to the constitutional text. 
This distinction expresses the intuitive idea that the meaning of a text is 
one thing, but the legal effect is another. Thus, constitutional provisions are 
given legal effect both through the decision of constitutional cases and judicially 
crafted implementing rules and other constitutional doctrines. 
The process of interpretation and construction might involve two steps: 
first, the judge discovers the meaning of the text (“interpretation”), and second, 
the judge determines the legal effect of the text.19 In some cases, the meaning of 
the text will be sufficiently precise to determine the legal effect. In other cases, 
the text may be underdeterminate, because the words and phrases are vague or 
open textured, or for some other reason.20 We can call the set of cases and issues 
for which the text is underdeterminate the “construction zone”—expressing the 
idea that in such cases, constitutional construction is necessary to determine 
legal effect.21 
C.  THE PUBLIC MEANING THESIS 
Public meaning originalism affirms the Public Meaning Thesis, which can 
be stated as follows: 
The Public Meaning Thesis is the claim that the best understanding of original 
meaning is the content communicated or made accessible to the public by the 
 
 18. On the interpretation-construction distinction, see generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) [hereinafter Solum, The Interpretation-Construction 
Distinction]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 
(2013). For the history of the distinction in the context of contract law, see Gregory Klass, Contracts, 
Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right, 18 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 13 
(2020). 
 19.  This simple picture does not fully capture the actual process. Judges may begin with construction and 
then check their view of what the law should be against the text. And as a theoretical matter, the decision as to 
what meaning (for example, public meaning versus drafter’s intent) should be recovered must precede 
interpretation. We are grateful to Gregory Klass for emphasizing the importance of this point. See Klass, supra 
note 18, at 15 (“What meaning a text or other speech act has depends on the questions one asks of it.”). 
 20. In addition to vagueness and open texture, underdeterminacy may result from gaps or contradictions in 
the text.  
 21. See Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, supra note 18, at 108 (introducing the phrase 
“construction zone” to refer to the set of cases and issues that are underdetermined by the communicative content 
of a legal text). 
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text at the time each constitutional provision was framed and ratified.22 
This thesis is predicated on an understanding of the situation of 
constitutional communication: the constitutional text was written for the public. 
For the most part, the text was written in ordinary language, comprehensible to 
ordinary citizens who spoke American English (at the relevant time). Some 
constitutional provisions use technical language: the phrase “Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal” is an example.23 But so long as the use of specialized language 
would have been apparent to readers and the technical meaning could be 
discerned with reasonable effort, the meaning of the Constitution would have 
been accessible to the public.24 
D.  ORIGINALIST METHODOLOGY 
How can public meaning be recovered? In this Article, we are investigating 
the meaning of “citizen.” On the one hand, the word “citizen” has a familiar 
meaning that refers to a status that persons have in relationship to a political 
community: John Adams was a citizen of the United States and the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. On the other hand, “citizen” is a complex 
concept used in both law and political philosophy: the status of citizen has 
eligibility conditions and carries with it a set of rights and responsibilities. Our 
goal is to recover the original public meaning of the word “citizen” and thereby 
to recover the concept of citizenship as it was understood in the framing era. In 
order to accomplish this task, we will use some of the familiar tools of originalist 
methodology. These tools include: (1) the investigation of semantic meanings 
using period dictionaries and corpus linguistics, (2) the study of the 
constitutional record, including both the history of framing and ratification as 
well as the wider intellectual context that would have been familiar to many who 
participated in the framing and ratification of Article III, and (3) immersion in 
the linguistic world of the late eighteenth century. We develop an innovative 
way to make the third method tractable in this context.25 
E.  THE ROLE OF ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING IN NONORIGINALIST 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORIES 
Although this Article is written from an originalist perspective, we believe 
our results are relevant to lawyers, judges, and legal scholars who reject 
originalism. There are many different forms of living constitutionalism,26 but 
 
 22. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: Communicative Content Is the Original Meaning 
of the Constitutional Text (2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 24. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 429–
31 (2009) (discussing the role of the division of linguistic labor and technical meaning). 
 25. On originalist methodology, see Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus 
Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1643, 1649, 1670–71 (2017) 
[hereinafter Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 269, 270 (2017). 
 26. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of 
the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1271–76 (2019). 
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one of the most important strands of contemporary nonoriginalist constitutional 
theory is “constitutional pluralism,” the view that there are “multiple modalities” 
or plural methods of constitutional argument. The list of modalities is contested, 
but a representative list would include the constitutional text and structure, 
historical practice, precedent, constitutional values, and workability. For 
pluralists who believe that the constitutional text is one of the modalities of 
constitutional interpretation and construction, the original meaning of “citizen” 
will be relevant to the interpretation of the Diversity Clause—even if it is not a 
decisive factor.27 
Of course, some living constitutionalists may reject the relevance of 
original meaning altogether.28 We believe, however, that rejection of the 
constitutional text as a relevant factor is rare among nonoriginalist judges. We 
are not aware of empirical research on this question, but we believe that very 
few judges or Justices would affirm the proposition that original meaning is 
completely irrelevant. For that reason, we believe that our findings are relevant 
to lawyers and almost all judges—even if some legal scholars would reject 
original meaning as a factor in constitutional interpretation and construction. 
II.  THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “CITIZEN”: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 
“Citizen’s” relationship to corporations is often presented as a simple-to-
solve originalist question—too simple to justify the effort we expend below.29 
Reality is different. Because the concept of citizenship predated the rise of the 
modern corporation, assessing how Article III’s original semantic content bears 
on modern corporations’ “citizen” status turns out to pose some thorny 
challenges.  
This Part explains these challenges and how we deal with them. Subpart A 
starts by introducing some concepts from the philosophy of language that inform 
our analysis. Supbart B.1 introduces the problem just discussed and then shows 
why some seemingly promising solutions turn out to be dead ends. Subpart B.2 
then identifies the way forward¾and, in the process, briefly sketches the basic 
claim we will develop in later Parts. 
Supbart C, finally, ends with an overview of some evidentiary hurdles our 
investigation will face along the way—as well as our method for surmounting 
them. 
 
 27. There are several versions of constitutional pluralism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991); Stephen M. Griffin, Pluralism in Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1753, 1753 (1994) (“Pluralistic theories of constitutional interpretation hold that there are multiple legitimate 
methods of interpreting the Constitution.”); Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and 
the Combinability Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1751–84 (2013); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1252–69 (1987). 
 28. For example, constitutional rejectionism, the view that the constitutional text should play no role in 
constitutional adjudication, would also seem to reject the relevance of original meaning for constitutional 
practice. See generally LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL DISOBEDIENCE (2012). 
 29. See infra note 38. 
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A.  “SORTALS” 
Many words perform a “sorting” function—their semantic meaning allows 
us to sort individual people or things into a category or conceptual set.30 We will 
call such terms “sortal” terms or “sortals.” 31  
To perform its sorting function, a sortal’s semantic meaning conveys 
identity criteria—criteria specifying conditions for assigning an individual 
object to the set that the sortal describes.32 “Dog,” for example, communicates 
identity criteria that allow us to distinguish some animals from others by 
reference to criteria that define the property of being a dog (say, “a four-legged 
domesticated animal having a long snout that barks” or more technically, “a 
mammal with a specified set of genetic properties”). 
The identity criteria of some sortals (say, “shoe”) limit their set to 
inanimate objects. Others, like “man” or “woman,” limit that set to animate 
objects, and others, like “corporation,” describe “abstract objects.”33 Some 
sortals, finally, are further restricted—that is, their meaning is limited to a sub-
category of a kind. “Bachelor” is such a sortally restrictive word—its meaning 
not only conveys the state of being unmarried, a quality of an animate object 
(human beings), but refers only to a restricted kind of human being: historically, 
adult males.34 
Citizen is a sortal.35 And it has some obvious identity criteria. For example, 
all agreed at the relevant time periods that “citizen” was a status limited to 
“persons.”36 Our task is determining whether the meaning of citizen conveyed 
additional identity criteria that restricted the term to natural persons only or that 
also reached abstract objects conceptualized as “persons,” like corporations.37 
B.  IDENTIFYING THE SORTAL CONTENT OF CITIZENSHIP  
Having identified our task, we turn to history. In this Part, we begin in 
 
 30. This is a characteristic it shares with all “status” concepts. See Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in 
Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25, 25 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 
2016) (noting that status is a “method of . . . categorization”). 
 31. In the philosophy of language, sortals are often defined as terms whose semantic meaning supplies 
criteria for individuating countable kinds, which is consistent with our use of the term. Richard E. Grandy, 
Sortals, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., Winter 2016), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ 
win2016/entries/sortals/; Fred Feldman, Sortal Predicates, 7 NOȖS 268, 269 (1973) (discussing the criteria of 
sortalhood). 
 32. In the technical literature, these are sometimes called “counting criteria.” See Grandy, supra note 31. 
 33. For discussion of a corporation as an “abstract object,” see Grandy, supra note 31 (discussing “sortals 
for abstract objects,” which include “ideas,” “governments,” and “corporations”). 
 34. David Ian Beaver, Presupposition, in THE HANDBOOK OF LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 939, 944 (Johan van 
Benthem & Alice ter Meulen eds., 1997) (identifying “bachelor” as a sortally restrictive predicate). It is possible 
that gendered terms like bachelor are gradually becoming gender neutral and hence that the feminine equivalent 
term “bachelorette” and the older term “spinster” are falling out use; if so, then “bachelor” may eventually come 
to refer to unmarried adults irrespective of gender. 
 35. SORAN READER, NEEDS AND MORAL NECESSITY 106 (2007) (noting citizen’s sortal status).  
 36. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *333–36 (1765) (treating 
of the laws of alienage and subjecthood as legal statuses of “persons”); 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF 
AMERICAN LAW 57–84 (1851) (treating statuses of citizen, subject, and alien as statuses of “persons”). 
 37. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *455–73 (considering corporations under the heading of the rights of 
persons, and classifying corporate entities as “artificial” persons).  
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Subpart B.1 by identifying a problem: the fact that “citizen” was not applied to 
corporations in 1787, although relevant, will not suffice to establish that modern 
corporations stand outside the original meaning of “citizen.”  
This Part then surveys some possible solutions to this problem, which turn 
out to be dead ends, before identifying the path forward in Subpart B.2, which 
we will then develop in the remainder of the Article. 
1.  Application Patterns as Pro Tanto Evidence 
When we turn to 1787, one intuitive route to investigating this question is 
to examine whether there is a pattern, in the 1780s, of applying citizen 
exclusively to human beings. And, indeed, there was just such a pattern, as 
others have noted.38 We review this pattern later.39 Some will find it, by itself, 
decisive proof that corporations are not Article III citizens. 
These patterns of usage provide powerful evidence that the term “citizens” 
was conceptually limited to natural persons. But this evidence is pro tanto 
evidence and not decisive evidence. Evidence is “pro tanto” if it provides 
genuine support for a proposition, but is, nonetheless, consistent with the 
possibility that the proposition is false. Evidence is “decisive” if it is conclusive 
and therefore inconsistent with the possibility that the proposition is false. 
The fact that the word “citizen” was solely used to refer to human beings 
not corporations in the eighteenth century could, at least in theory, be consistent 
with the conclusion that the original meaning of the term citizens nonetheless 
embraces modern corporations. For this reason, this evidence, although strongly 
supportive of the conclusion that the word “citizens” is limited to natural persons 
is not, by itself, decisive. 
How is it possible that the original meaning of the word “citizens” could 
extend to modern corporations despite the fact that “citizens” was only to apply 
 
 38. ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 65 
(2018) (suggesting in cursory fashion that the tile of citizen “was reserved for human beings” in the framing 
period); Martin H. Redish & Peter B. Siegal, Constitutional Adjudication, Free Expression, and the Fashionable 
Art of Corporation Bashing, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1447, 1456 (2013) (reviewing TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (2012)) (noting in passing that “no corporation 
is a citizen in the purely ‘literal’ sense of the term” and characterizing the reasons that corporations have been 
treated as citizens under the Diversity Clause as purely “instrumental”); Jonathan A. Marcantel, The Corporation 
as a “Real” Constitutional Person, 11 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 221, 238–45, 261–65 (2011) (collecting evidence 
that “citizen” was universally applied to “corporeal beings” during the relevant constitutional framing periods); 
Brandon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 407 (2003) (expressing doubt about whether the framers 
intended the term “citizen” to encompass corporations); George F. Carpinello, State Protective Legislation and 
Nonresident Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause as a Treaty of Nondiscrimination, 73 IOWA 
L. REV. 351, 380 (1988) (noting that “[o]ne might conclude . . . that because the framers were not thinking of 
corporations when they used the term ‘citizen,’ it would be contravening the original intent to include them 
today,” but disagreeing with this conclusion based on an appeal to the framers’ “goals”); Dudley O. McGovney, 
A Supreme Court Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HARV. 
L. REV. 853, 861 (1943) (noting, albeit with a focus on nineteenth century caselaw, that “[the Supreme Court] 
has from beginning to the end held consistently and persistently that ‘citizen’ connotes a human being”); Charles 
Warren, Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship, 19 VA. L. REV. 661, 662 (1933) (“That the framers . . . ever 
contemplated that [the grant of diversity jurisdiction in the first Judiciary Act] would apply to corporations is 
extremely improbable,” given the infrequency of private corporations in the late eighteenth century). 
 39. See infra Part III.B.3. 
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to natural persons in the late eighteenth century? Consider the following thought 
experiment. Imagine, for example, that “citizen” meant “all legal persons” who 
are conceptualized as “private” (that is, having an identity apart from the state) 
and as “proper objects of a state’s general jurisdiction.” (This is the basic sense 
in which citizen, as it is used in Article III, is sometimes understood today).40 If 
corporations in the eighteenth century were conceptualized as arms of the 
state—and thus not a “private” person41—then we would observe the pattern we 
see in eighteenth-century linguistic usage. Citizen’s meaning would embrace 
natural persons in their private capacity, but not eighteenth-century corporations. 
But it would do no damage to the term’s original meaning to extend it to modern 
corporations, which are both conceptualized as private persons and as proper 
objects of a state’s general jurisdiction.42 
To be clear, we are not arguing that the linguistic evidence shows that this 
possibility was actually the case. The point of the thought experiment positing 
this possible state of linguistic affairs in the eighteenth century is to show that 
the failure to refer to eighteenth-century corporations as “citizens” does not 
logically entail the conclusion that twenty-first century corporations fall outside 
the eighteenth-century concept. 
To then decisively demonstrate modern corporations are not proper objects 
of the original conventional meaning of “citizen,” we have to cast beyond the 
pattern of applications of the word “citizen” observed in eighteenth-century 
practice (of using “citizens” only when referencing natural persons) and 
recapture the positive semantic content of citizen—the concept it conveyed, and 
the identity criteria entailed by that concept. 
The starting point for recovering those identity criteria is the Constitution’s 
text. Article III uses the term “citizen” without defining it. In 1787, though, other 
clauses suggested definitional criteria. Article II’s qualifications clause limited 
the presidency to “natural born citizen[s]” of the “United States.”43 And Article 
I vested Congress with power over “naturalization.”44 Together, both clauses 
suggested that citizens are persons who are either “natural born” or 
“naturalized.” Because corporations are abstract entities and cannot be born, it 
seems to follow that they cannot be “natural born.” And because they cannot be 
natural born, it might be argued that they are not the sort of entity that can be 
“naturalized.” Hence, these phrases might be thought to establish that the 
positive meaning of the word “citizen” only extends to natural persons, for 
example, human beings or members of the species “homo sapiens.”45 
The complication with treating these express criteria as the identity criteria 
of “citizen” is that nothing in the antebellum Constitution specifies these were 
 
 40. Compare Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010), with Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 41. See infra notes 145–146 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra Part III.B.3. 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, 
at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President.”). 
 44. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 45. We leave aside the question whether extraterrestrial aliens or an evolved intelligent animal species 
might be considered natural persons and hence citizens if they were born in the United States. 
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the only criteria for “citizenship.”46 Moreover, the presidential qualification 
clause relates to citizenship of “the United States.”47 And the naturalization 
clause has long been held to have a similar focus.48 Relying on either clause to 
infer the original 1787 meaning of an Article III “citizen[] of [a] State[]” 
accordingly implicates a notoriously thorny set of interpretive questions about 
the relationship between “state” citizenship, “United States” citizenship, and 
diversity jurisdiction under the antebellum Constitution.49 
We start at a different place, one that allows us to side-step those questions. 
The public meaning of the Constitution’s text is its conventional, or popular, 
meaning—the meaning words convey to ordinary users of English. While some 
words (“terms of art”) are technical—impossible for ordinary users to 
understand without reference to a legal specialist—the word “citizen” was 
widely used in popular sources and conveyed some implicit semantic content to 
ordinary English speakers. 
 
 46. Both criteria, to be sure, were the sum of the common law formula for “subjecthood,” which divided 
full subjects (as opposed to “denizens”) into native born and naturalized. See infra notes 70–73, 168 and 
accompanying text. Even so, Locke and international law writers familiar to the framers suggested contractual 
criteria distinct from the common law formula might be relevant to “citizenship.” ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC 
IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 78–80, 130 (1997) (discussing role of Lockean 
consensualism in theories of citizenship, including its influence on international law theorists like Burlamaqi 
and Vattel, and noting framers failed to resolve the tension between consensualism and “ascriptive” common 
law criteria for state membership). Nor is it clear Americans uniformly understood the concepts “born” 
citizenship or “naturalization,” in the 1780s, in ways consistent with the common law usage of either term. See 
JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 231–32 (1978) (noting 
uncertainty about the power of states and the federal government to distinguish between natives, accepting some 
as “natural born” citizens and rejecting others); SMITH, supra, at 130 (discussing ambiguity of “natural born 
citizenship,” although noting framers likely used it in the common law sense). 
 47. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and Rights of Citizens, 69 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1721, 1724 (2001) (“The original Constitution mentions national citizenship only in the 
presidential qualification clause . . . .”). 
 48. Peter L. Markowitz, Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 
890 n.90 (2015) (noting the standard view that the naturalization clause regulates admission to national 
citizenship). But see KETTNER, supra note 46, at 231–32 (noting uncertainty, after ratification, about whether 
the naturalization power was “merely an administrative reform designed to standardize admission to state 
membership or a recognition that citizenship . . . primarily meant membership in a national community”) 
 49. In 1787, the relationship between citizens “of” a state and citizens “of the United States,” and the 
relevance of citizenship “of the United States” to diversity jurisdiction were far from clear. KETTNER, supra note 
46, at 231–32 (“The framers dealt with the [nature of individual citizenship] tangentially, and, in consequence, 
the constitutional provisions involving citizenship contained profound ambiguities that would become apparent 
only long after the new government went into operation.”). That uncertainty played out over the antebellum 
period, coming to a head in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). There, Chief Justice Taney and Benjamin 
Curtis both agreed with the basic principle that developed in the early decades of the Republic that “a citizen of 
the United States, residing in any State of the Union, is, for purposes of jurisdiction, a citizen of that state.” See 
id. at 571 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276, 1276–77 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) 
(Marshall, J.). But they disagreed about the conditions for citizenship in the “United States.” Taney’s infamous 
opinion contended national citizenship was governed by standards independent of state law, which he contended 
included race-based criteria. Scott, 60 U.S. at 404–07. Justice Curtis advocated the more common antebellum 
view, that citizenship in the United States was, with respect to natives, entirely derivative of state law. Id. at 
577–82 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 71 (1978) (the general antebellum position was to “regard state citizenship as 
primary, with United States citizenship deriving from it”). Other antebellum commentators took the view that 
the national citizenship was governed by the non-racial criteria of the common law. See infra notes 240–246 and 
accompanying text; see also Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sand. Ch. 583, 619–20 (N.Y. Ch. 1844) (treating the issue of 
national citizenship as a judicial question governed by the common law, at least absent national legislation to 
the contrary). 
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That implicit content determined what the word “citizen” conveyed to the 
public in the context of Article III and therefore it provides the constitutional 
meaning of “citizen.” To enjoy the rights of constitutional citizenship, whether 
the word is used in relation to “states” or “the United States,” one must meet 
“citizen’s” original popular identity criteria. If corporations do not meet those 
criteria, they were not “citizens,” state or federal, within the original public 
meaning of the Constitution of 1787.50 
Our focus is on this implicit content. When we turn toward identity criteria 
implicit in the term’s popular meaning, a common impulse is to focus on what 
(if anything) “citizen” popularly conveyed about someone’s legal entitlements, 
and then reason backward from that information to a conclusion about who 
“belongs” to the set of “citizens.” 51 Thus, if the right to vote is fundamental to 
the popular concept of citizenship, we could characterize the popular meaning 
of citizenship as “a person who is entitled to vote.” We might then reason that if 
corporations are not the kind of thing that is a proper object of the “right to vote,” 
corporations do not meet the popular identity criteria for “citizens.” 
Once again, this evidence provides only pro tanto support for the 
proposition that only natural persons could be citizens. First, in the 1780s, it was 
far from clear what rights, exactly, were intrinsic to citizenship. Some 1780s 
accounts of citizenship associated the word with the enjoyment of a set of 
fundamental civil, but not political, rights—equal rights to own, convey, and 
inherit property, or travel freely, for example—some of which seem perfectly 
coherent to ascribe to corporations.52 Others associated citizenship with political 
 
 50. As a result, the content of “state citizenship” for purposes of Article III may differ in material ways 
from the state’s local definition of “citizen.” An environmentally conscious state might, for example, define 
“trees” as “citizens” of the state. If, however, trees don’t meet the popular identity criteria of original citizenship, 
they would not qualify as “citizens” of the state for purposes of rights conferred on citizens of a state by the 
federal constitution. In this, we take a position consistent with Justice Marshall’s construction of Article III in 
Prentiss, 19 F. Cas. at 1276 (holding that Article III “citizenship” is a question of federal law). The concept of 
state citizenship in Article III may bear some resemblance to a “patterning definition,” under which the original 
popular meaning of citizen sets baseline criteria for Article III “citizenship,” some of which operate 
independently of subconstitutional law (limiting constitutional citizenship to natural persons), while others refer 
to the content of legal backdrops external to the constitution (for example, specifying that to be a state citizen, a 
natural person must satisfy certain common law or state law requirements, depending on which backdrop 
relevant legal analysis points us toward.) Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 
VA. L. REV. 885, 893 (2000) (using a patterning definition approach to constitutional “property” and concluding 
that different definitions attach in different clauses that use the word “property”). See also infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
 51. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 162 (1795) (Iredell, J.) defining citizens as “members of the society,” 
who “claim rights in society, which it is the duty of the society to protect” and who are “in . . . turn . . . under a 
solemn obligation to discharge all those duties faithfully, which he owes, as a citizen, to the society of which he 
is a member”); CHARLOTTE C. WELLS, LAW AND CITIZENSHIP IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE, at xiii (1995) (noting 
citizenship is generally defined as “membership in a group” that carries with it rights to “civil rights and political 
rights”); id. (noting we typically “distinguish citizens by the rights they possess as members of the state”). 
 52. This is often termed the “liberal conception” of citizenship. Iseult Honohan, Liberal and Republican 
Conceptions of Citizenship, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CITIZENSHIP 83, 85–94 (Ayalet Shachar, Rainer 
Bauböck, Irene Bloemraad & Maarten Vink eds., 2017). As Charlotte Wells notes, the liberal conception is, in 
fact, not modern—its origins lie in the late medieval Roman law. WELLS, supra note 51, at xv. A number of 
examples of usage in the 1780s are consistent with this conception—see, for example, the use of “citizen” as a 
“synonym” for “subject” in American treaties granting contracting parties’ members reciprocal rights during the 
Articles of Confederation period. See, e.g., Treaty of Paris of Sept. 3, 1783, 1 MALLOY, TREATIES 468 (1910) 
(referring to the “subjects of Great Britain” and the “citizens of the United States”). These reciprocity clauses, 
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rights (voting, the right to hold office), which seem improper to associate with 
corporations.53 As a result, focusing on the information about the type of rights 
intrinsic to the term citizen does not provide decisive evidence.54 
More fundamentally, though, focusing simply on whether someone is a 
“proper” object of whatever rights were “fundamental” to citizenship (1) ignores 
other important parts of the term’s semantic meaning in a way that (2) may cause 
us to miss the inclusivity and radicality of the term. 
Scott v. Sandford55 is a particularly terrible example of this kind of 
analytical error. There, the Taney Court defined “citizen” as the quality of 
enjoying civil or political privilege.56 But it then reasoned from the fact African 
Americans had been systematically deprived of the privileges of national 
citizenship to the conclusion that African Americans were not proper objects of 
that status.57 
The Court’s tragic mistake here, as Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward 
Bates noted in 1862, was ignoring that “citizen” communicated identity criteria 
apart from whatever rights the status conveyed—and those criteria performed 
the crucial work of sorting who belongs to the “citizen” category and thus is 
entitled to those rights.58 Those identity criteria did not include race.59 By 
 
by equating citizens and subjects, clearly use citizen as a term for members of the body politic, inclusive of those 
who did not, at the time, qualify for the elective franchise. See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause secures the “fundamental” rights of 
citizenship automatically guaranteed by the Privileges and Immunities Clause, “to which may be added the 
elective franchise,” but only to the extent “established” and “regulated” by state law); see also CHRISTOPHER R. 
GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGINAL SENSE OF THE PRIVILEGES 
OR IMMUNITIES CLAUSE 43–45 (2015) (noting some doubt about whether Washington included the right to 
suffrage among fundamental rights of citizenship, but that other cases excluded it from that category); Chisholm 
v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793) (“citizens” are “as to civil rights perfectly equal”). 
 53. This is often termed the civic republican conception of citizenship. Honohan, supra note 52, at 85–94. 
For period examples adopting this definition, see JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, A TREATISE ON THE SOCIAL 
COMPACT; OR THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL LAW 22–23 (T. Becket & P.A. de Hondt eds., 1764) (“With regard 
to the associates [of a republic or body politic] themselves, they take collectively the name of the people, and 
are separately called citizens, as partaking of the sovereign authority, and subjects, as subjected to the laws of 
the state.”); Denis Diderot, Citizen, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIC LIBERTY: POLITICAL ARTICLES IN THE 
DICTIONARY OF DIDEROT AND D’ALEMBERT 49, 52–53 (Henry C. Clark ed., Henry C. Clark & Christine Dunn 
Henderson trans., 2016) (1753) (“[O]ne has no clear distinction between subject and citizen unless the latter is 
supposed to be a public man . . . .”). 
 54. This, indeed, may have been a component of the meaning of the term that was largely technical. In any 
event, we take no firm view on the exact tranche of rights, privileges, or immunities (if any) that were 
“fundamental” to the concept of citizenship during the 1787 framing period. 
 55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).  
 56. Id. at 476 (“[T]here is not, it is believed, to be found, in the theories of writers on Government, or in 
any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as 
conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment, of an entire 
equality of privileges, civil and political.”). 
 57. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 350 (noting the circularity of Taney’s argument). 
 58. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 383–84 (1862) (“In most instances, within my knowledge, in which 
the matter of citizenship has been discussed, the argument has not turned on the existence and the intrinsic 
qualities of citizenship itself, but upon the claim of some right or privilege as belonging to and inhering in the 
character of citizen. In this way we are easily led into errors of fact and principle.”). 
 59. Id. at 385 (“The Constitution of the United States does not declare who are and who are not citizens, 
nor does it attempt to describe the constituent elements of citizenship. It leaves that quality where it found it, 
resting upon the fact of home-birth, and upon the laws of the several States.”); id. at 388 (“In my opinion, the 
Constitution uses the word citizen only to express the political quality of the individual in relation to the nation; 
to declare he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the 
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focusing only on the rights associated with the status, and then reasoning about 
whether those rights “properly” belong to a particular status-claimant, the Taney 
Court had substituted its own historically and culturally conditioned 
assumptions about who is a “proper” holder of the privileges of national 
citizenship for the actual sortal content of “citizenship’s” public meaning.60 In 
other words, the Taney Court mistook pro tanto evidence for decisive 
evidence.61 
2.  A Way Forward 
We take a different tack by turning from what rights “citizen” conveyed to 
the duties it communicated. Legal status terms communicate that the status-
holder occupies a commonly understood moral position, which the law treats as 
legally significant. The law in turn cashes out that moral position through 
workaday legal proxies for ascertaining who occupies that position and then 
defines a package of legal consequences entailed by occupying it. As a result, 
legal-status words like “citizen” convey a mix of popular and technical 
meaning.62 
We think “citizen” in 1787 worked much like this. It identified someone as 
an occupier of a commonly understood moral position involving moral duties to 
a political community. English-speakers understood, though, that law supplied 
the exact criteria that sorted people into the position and specified the legal 
 
one side and protection on the other.”); id. at 395 (“In every civilized country the individual is born to duties and 
rights, the duty of allegiance and the right to protection; and these are correlative obligations, the one the price 
of the other, and they constitute the all-sufficient bond of union between the individual and his country . . . .”). 
 60. The same kind of error can occur in this context (although with far less terrible normative 
consequences). For example, it seems facially intuitive that if in 1787 voting was intrinsic to citizenship, 
corporations would not count as such because they are not the type of persons that vote. But that intuition leads 
us astray—in England, until 1832, the franchise to vote for members of Parliament, in some cases, vested not in 
individuals, but in local municipal corporations (the so-called “corporation boroughs”), which exercised the vote 
through the corporate council of burgesses. See Constituencies 1754-1790, HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT, 
https://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/research/constituencies/constituencies-1754-1790 (last visited Nov. 
23, 2020). This points out that even if citizenship means someone “whose status entitles them to vote,” we can’t 
rely on our historically conditioned intuitions about a “natural category” of persons who can “vote” to decide 
whether corporations are or are not citizens. Nor can we simply note that corporations weren’t, in fact, given a 
right to vote for any office in any relevant jurisdiction in 1787 or later—perhaps, if we consult the appropriate 
identity criteria, we might learn some corporations are in fact “citizens” whose have been disenfranchised. 
Instead, we need to look more closely at other identity criteria, apart from whatever rights are intrinsic to the 
status, to figure out who is a proper subject of the citizen category. 
 61. The Taney Court also made demonstrably false claims about what the pro tanto evidence showed at 
the relevant fixation period. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 346–54 (noting that Taney’s argument 
was a “gross perversion of the facts”). 
 62. For more, see Miller, supra note 30, at 27 n.4 (distinguishing between moral and legal statuses, but 
noting that these statuses are not “mutually exclusive” and that some legal statuses are or ought to be “informed 
by a proper appreciation of moral status”); id. at 33 (“[S]tatuses designate categorically—i.e., they define a 
normative position, a position to which persons or groups are assigned through the attribution of the status.”); 
id. at 34 n.14 (arguing statuses are “abbreviating concepts” that using simplifying criteria to “sum up” a person’s 
legal or moral position) (quoting Jeremy Waldron, Does “Equal Moral Status” Add Anything to Right Reason? 
3 (N.Y.U. School of L. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. Paper Series, Working Paper No. 11-52, 2011), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1898689); id. at 35 (“Statuses simplify semantically by 
giving us a provisional conceptual characterization of the normative position held by a person, . . . thereby 
relieving us of the burden of fully articulating . . . our conceptualization of that position in each and every case 
we might have to refer to it.”).  
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consequences of occupying that position. But the core moral concept and duties 
the term conveyed were accessible to ordinary users of the English language and 
drew boundaries, for lawyer and lay people alike, around who could occupy the 
status.  
Specifically, we will show that speakers in the 1780s, while disagreeing 
about many particulars about the meaning of “citizenship,” agreed that to be a 
“citizen” was to owe a reciprocal duty of “attachment” (sometimes, but not 
always, described as “allegiance”) to a republican community in exchange for 
its protection. This attachment, in turn, was understood as an affective or 
solidaristic tie. As a result, part of what it meant to be a “citizen” was to be 
“someone who was a proper object of an expectation of an affective tie to a 
society or its ideals.”63 
To be a proper object of an expectation of solidaristic attachment to a 
community is to be someone who is capable of forming social ties. Because that 
is a capacity restricted to natural persons, or human beings, “citizen” was a term 
whose original conventional meaning was limited to a restricted set, natural 
persons. This is the claim we will develop below. 
C.  THE PROBLEM OF PRESUPPOSED MEANING  
Before we do, though, we need to address one last evidentiary challenge 
and explain how we go about addressing it.  
“Citizen,” we are claiming, is a sortally restrictive word—when used in a 
sentence, it conveys a restriction on the sort of things (“persons”) that are the 
word’s subject. Because, though, this sortal restriction is part of the term’s 
meaning, “citizen” often calls for a “presupposition”—an inference that the 
term’s subject meets its restrictive identity criteria.64 If we say that “a person is 
a citizen,” the meaning of the term “citizen” calls for a presupposition that the 
“person” I’m referring to is a natural person. Or if we say, “the government 
must respect the rights of citizens,” the term citizen calls for a presupposition 
that I am talking about the rights of natural persons. 
That in turn means that one increasingly common tool for investigating 
semantic meaning, corpus linguistics (or corpus analytics), turns out to be of 
somewhat limited use here. Corpus linguistics provides a window into meaning 
by aggregating data about usage, including information about the company that 
words keep (with a focus on words that tend to travel in close proximity to the 
word studied). But when the word is used in sentences like the ones above, the 
studied term doesn’t need help from surrounding words to convey that the 
subject of the term meets its restrictive identity criteria because “citizen” implies 
 
 63. In this our claim is similar to Attorney General Edward Bates’ characterization of the original meaning 
of the term. See Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 388 (1862) (“In my opinion, the Constitution uses the word 
citizen only to express . . . [that the individual] is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by a reciprocal 
obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other.”). 
 64. See Beaver, supra note 34, at 944 (“Sortally restricted predicates presuppose rather than assert that 
their arguments are of the appropriate sort. For example, . . . predicative use of ‘a bachelor’ presupposes that the 
predicated individual is adult and male.”). 
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that restriction. 
And so, if the word “citizen” is used in a lot of sentences like the examples 
just given, where the “citizen’s” natural personhood is presupposed rather than 
made explicit in immediately surrounding text, aggregating data about words 
that “travel with” citizen may not be helpful. In linguistics, these words are 
called “collocates” and corpus linguistics allows us to identify the collocates of 
the word “citizen” in the late eighteenth century. Collocates of “citizen” may 
convey that citizen communicates something about “persons” and “rights,” 
without telling us whether it was a term whose meaning conveys something 
about the rights of natural persons only. A corpus analysis of the collocates of 
“citizen” can thus provide pro tanto evidence that the conceptual content of 
“citizen” was limited to natural persons, but it cannot provide decisive evidence. 
The same problem recurs when we try to recover the normative content the 
term conveyed. As a result, uncovering the sortal restrictions embedded in the 
concept of “citizen” requires what one of us has called “immersion”—that is, 
careful study of usage in a fuller context than standard tools of corpus analytics, 
like the compilation of a concordance, allows.65 We take a multi-pronged 
approach to that task.  
First, in some contexts, immersion can be aided by historians who have 
already engaged in the immersive project. Below, we make liberal use of prior 
historical work, which support our basic claim—that in the eighteenth century, 
“citizen” conveyed a normative expectation of a kind of affective “tie” to a 
political community or its creedal ideals, limiting the term to natural persons. 
We will also cross-check this historical evidence with contemporaneous 
statements by the framers as well as corpus-based linguistic analysis of “citizen” 
in a wider context than traditional corpus analytics databases allow.66 
We can do the latter linguistic analysis without having to read everything. 
Unlike classic political tracts, which often used the term in an indeterminate, 
generic way, literary tracts in the 1770s and 1780s use the term “citizen” 
sparingly. But, when the word “citizen” appears once or twice in a work, the 
word is usually chosen with intention, because its popular semantic content 
reinforces the themes of the passage in which it is used. As a result, careful 
critical reading of the word’s context in a wide array of period literary works 
turns out to be a valuable window into the popular presuppositions about 
“citizen’s” normative content.  
The forgoing forms of evidence are all what we call “positive.” They 
combine to paint a picture of citizen’s positive semantic content—the duties and 
normative expectations the term conveyed as well as the identity criteria 
embedded in that normative content. We can also, finally, further corroborate 
 
 65. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning, supra note 25, at 1649–52 (discussing immersion and 
distinguishing it from intellectual history). 
 66. For more on the use of cross-checking or triangulation in the investigation of public meaning, see id. 
at 1667–81. In order to marshal a complex array of material into a coherent historical narrative for the reader, 
we present this “triangulating” evidence synthetically, rather than rigidly corralling each piece of evidence into 
its own discrete stand-alone section. 
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our claims with what we call “negative” evidence—an absence of applications 
of “citizen” at odds with our positive claims. By itself, as we discussed earlier, 
evidence that citizen was only applied to natural persons in 1787 provides only 
pro tanto support for our conclusion,67 but combined with the positive evidence 
summarized above, it is decisive. 
Together all of this evidence combines to make out a strong case that 
“citizen” was a term for human beings (natural persons). We turn to that 
evidence in the next Part. 
III.  CORPORATIONS AND THE PUBLIC MEANING OF CITIZEN IN 1787–88 
Our claim, introduced in the last Part, is that in 1787–88, the crucial period 
for the fixation of the original public meaning, “citizen” was a status whose 
positive semantic content communicated its holder’s capacity to form 
solidaristic or “affective” ties—a sortal criterion that limited the status to natural 
persons.  
After a short overview of our evidentiary case for this claim in Subpart A, 
Subpart B turns to develop that case in detail.  
Subpart B is divided between what the last Part termed “positive” and 
“negative” evidence.68 The “positive evidence”—that is, evidence directly 
bearing on “citizen’s” positive semantic content¾is developed across B.1 and 
B.2. B.1 presents a synthesis of previous historical accounts and new primary 
source evidence, in the form of contemporaneous statements by leading framers 
and jurists. B.2 presents our corroborating corpus-derived data. “Negative 
evidence,” or evidence that contemporaneous applications “fit” our claims about 
citizen’s positive content, is then reviewed in B.3.69 
Subpart C ends by introducing and rejecting a competing claim about the 
original meaning of “citizen”—one that equates “citizenship” with simple 
subjection to what we today would call a state’s “general jurisdiction.” We show 
this claim—while more congenial to the concept of corporate 
citizenship¾involves a sense of the word that arose in American usage after 
Article III’s ratification. It is, therefore, no part of the Diversity Clause’s original 
meaning. 
A.  SETTING THE STAGE 
Words can become associated together in word families that form a 
conceptual genus—they all share some basic semantic content. When new terms 
are added to that family, they sometimes pick up some of the distinguishing 
features of their semantic cousins. 
This is part of the story of citizenship. It was a term that entered upon a set 
stage. By the 1780s, English-speaking people had a long tradition of describing 
the legal and moral relationship between a person and political community. And 
 
 67. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
 68. See supra Part II.C. 
 69. See supra Part II.C for an overview of our use of corpus-derived evidence and negative evidence. 
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the words describing that relationship—“subject” and “alien”—shared a 
conceptual boundary, or sortal restriction. They applied only to particular kinds 
of persons—natural persons. 
Natural born subjects were those who, because they were born under the 
protection of the king, had natural allegiance to him.70 “Naturalized” subjects 
were, in turn, aliens who, because they had been “adopted” through the process 
of naturalization, enjoyed rights on similar terms as natural born subjects and 
were also an object of expected allegiance to the king.71 Unlike natural born 
subjects, their allegiance was “acquired” or volitional, not “natural born.”72 An 
“alien,” finally, was someone born out of the protection of the king, and who 
therefore had an allegiance to a “different Society.”73  
These common law state membership categories were thus a function of 
two variables: (1) information about circumstances of “birth” (whether one was 
born within or without the protection of the relevant sovereign) and (2) related 
information about the sovereign to whom you owed “allegiance.”  
In America, the exact relationship between birth and citizenship 
 
 70. ANONYMOUS, A LAW GRAMMAR; OR, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ENGLISH 
JURISPRUDENCE 208 (London, G. G. J. and J. Robinson; T. Whieldon; W. Clarke; and Ogilvy and Speare 1791) 
(“Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that is within the 
allegiance of the King . . . .”); id. at 208–09 (“Allegiance, both express and implied, is distinguished into two 
species, the one natural, the other local. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the King’s 
dominions . . . . Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien or stranger for so long time as he continues in 
the King’s dominion and protection . . . .”). Coke noted that birth to a temporary alien sojourner in the dominion 
of the King was sufficient to make a natural born subject. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 384 (K.B.). 
 71. ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 212 (“Naturalization cannot be performed but by Act of Parliament, for 
by this an alien is put exactly in the same state as if he had been born in the King’s legiance, except only that he 
is incapable . . . of being a member of the privy council, member of parliament, &c.”). The power to “naturalize” 
lay exclusively with Parliament. Id. The King could not “naturalize” but could ameliorate the disabilities of 
alienage by making an alien a “denizen”—someone granted permanent residence and, with it, a lesser tranche 
of property rights (the right to own and convey but not to inherit or transmit property through inheritance, except 
in carefully defined circumstances). Id.; see also ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
CONNECTICUT: IN SIX BOOKS 165 (1795) (“When a foreigner becomes naturalized, he owes to the country which 
has adopted him, the same allegiance as a natural born subject . . . .”); KETTNER, supra note 46, at 30–33. 
 72. The common law distinguished between “natural allegiance” or “ligentia naturalis” of the natural-born; 
“acquired allegiance” or “ligentia acquisita,” which “pertained to those who were subjects not by birth, but 
conquest, denization or naturalization”; and “local allegiance” or “ligentia localis,” the “allegiance” of visiting 
aliens. See KETTNER, supra note 46, at 17 n.18. Natural allegiance was Coke’s focus in Calvin’s Case. Id. 
Acquired allegiance gave the alien born subject to another sovereign a fictive “new birth” through consent of 
the nation and “transferred all the attributes that Coke ascribed to the allegiance owed by native 
Englishmen . . . [to] the adopted member.” Id. at 40, 42. Local allegiance was a more “limited” obligation of 
“obedience” to local laws during a sojourn in a foreign country under the protection of the local sovereign. Id. 
at 49; see also A GENTLEMAN OF THE INNER TEMPLE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. BEING A 
CONTINUATION OF LORD CHIEF BARON COMYN’S DIGEST, BROUGHT DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME 3 (London, 
W. Strahan & M. Woodfall 1776) (describing the allegiance of a visiting alien as a “temporary local allegiance,” 
and contrasting it to the “permanent” natural allegiance of a subject); see also Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 
383–84 (characterizing local obedience as “wrought by the law” and “momentary and uncertain”). 
 73. THOMAS BLOUNT & WILLIAM NELSON, A LAW-DICTIONARY AND GLOSSARY, INTERPRETING SUCH 
DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS, AS ARE FOUND EITHER IN OUR COMMON OR STATUTE, ANCIENT 
OR MODERN, LAWS 29 (3d ed. 1717) (defining an “alien” as “one born in a strange Country” or “born out of the 
King’s allegiance”); 1 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW BY A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE 
TEMPLE 76 (1736) (“An alien is one born in a strange Country and different Society, to which he is presumed to 
have a natural and necessary Allegiance . . . .”); ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 207 (“[A]liens are such as are 
born out of [the King’s allegiance].”); 1 RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 30 (London, 
A. Strahan & W. Woodfall 1792) (“Alien is one that is born out of the dominions of the crown of England.”). 
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crystallized only in the early decades of the nineteenth century.74 And so we 
defer discussing that relationship in detail until Part IV’s treatment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause.75  
In this Part, we focus, instead, on the other identity criterion of common 
law subjecthood: allegiance. As we develop below, the “allegiance” about which 
the terms “subject” and “alien” conveyed information was an affective tie—a 
complex social attachment only real human beings can form.76 As a result, 
“subject” and “alien” conveyed a basic sortal restriction. They were legal 
statuses of natural persons. 
This sortal restriction, the Subparts below show, was ported into the new 
American state membership term, “citizenship” in the 1770s and 80s. Americans 
defined “citizens” of a community, first and foremost, persons who were 
properly expected to possess an affective tie to that community or its creedal 
values—sometimes describing that tie as “allegiance,” but also describing it 
using new cognate concepts in an effort to distance the American experiment 
from the monarchies of the Old World.  
The affective tie of individuals to their community was central to 
citizenship; this central criterion entailed that “citizen” was, like “subject” and 
“alien” before it, a word for “persons” capable of complex social attachments—
that is, real human beings. 
B.  THE AFFECTIVE TIE: THE ORIGINAL SORTAL CONTENT OF “CITIZEN” 
We begin with the movement from “subject” to “citizen” and the role that 
allegiance plays in the conceptual structure of both terms. We will then turn to 
corroborating corpus evidence. 
1.  From the Allegiance of a “Subject” to the Affective “Tie” of a Citizen 
Philip Hamburger, in his landmark survey of the English and early 
American law of allegiance and protection, describes allegiance as rational rule-
following behavior.77 To be a subject is to owe obedience to the law in exchange 
for protection—a contract formed on rationally self-interested grounds.78  
This though is not the only way to conceptualize allegiance. Judith Shklar, 
in one of her last published works, differentiated allegiance, and related concepts 
of loyalty and fidelity, from obedience.79 Obedience, she said, involves rational 
rule-following behavior. Allegiance, loyalty, and fidelity are, by contrast, 
“deeply affective”—they involve complex solidaristic attachments either to 
abstract associations (loyalty), individuals (fidelity), or a fusion of both 
 
 74. See infra notes 213-215 and accompanying text. 
 75. See infra notes 213–248 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra notes 78–126 and accompanying text. 
 77. Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823, 1838–40 (2009). 
 78. Id. at 1839 (“Underlying the reciprocal nature of allegiance and protection was the logic of consent” 
and “an understanding of nature”). Blackstone’s Commentaries, as Hamburger notes, at times describes 
allegiance this way: as an obligation founded in “reason and the nature of government.” Id. at 1840 (quoting 1 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *366). 
 79. Judith N. Shklar, Obligation, Loyalty, Exile, 21 POL. THEORY 181, 182–85 (1993). 
190 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:169 
(allegiance).80  
Shklar’s unpacking of allegiance, in turn, comes closer than Hamburger’s 
to capturing the rich way the word was used in the common law tradition.81 To 
be a subject of Great Britain was to be an object not simply of an obligation of 
legal obedience, but also an expectation of “affective” or solidaristic attachment 
to the body politic.  
The conception of allegiance as a “moral and affective” bond between king 
and subject was mirrored, dramatically, in the greatest literature of the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries.82 Shakespeare described allegiance as a “love of 
soul”83 and located allegiance “in” the “hearts” or “bosoms” of men. Thus, in 
Henry IV, Part 1, the titular king schooled Prince Hal on how to “pluck 
allegiance from men’s hearts.”84 Or in Henry V, the Earl of Westmoreland 
describes “smooth” and duplicitous traitors who act “as if allegiance in their 
bosom sat, crowned with faith and constant loyalty.”85  
The link between allegiance and sentiment was not, though, just a dramatic 
conceit. It was central to the formula of common law of subjecthood articulated 
in Edward Coke’s seminal 1608 opinion in Calvin’s Case.86  
“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her member and parts,” Coke 
wrote, are qualities that the “finger of God” placed in the “soul” and “heart” of 
men.87 As Lord Ellesmere would put in his 1609 summary of Calvin’s Case, it 
was accordingly a tie that flowed only from natural persons to natural persons: 
 
 80. Id. at 184; see also NOAH PICKUS, TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE: IMMIGRATION AND AMERICAN CIVIC 
NATIONALISM 1 (2005) (noting that the “invocation of faith and allegiance” in the American oath of allegiance 
“seems to suggest something deeper, a change in one’s self and belonging akin to religious conversion”). 
 81. Hamburger’s discussion of allegiance is more appropriate to the concept of “ligentia localis” or “local 
allegiance” or aliens within the United States, which is his primary subject. See Hamburger, supra note 77, at 
1847–66 (analyzing the implications of the concept of allegiance mostly with a focus on the rights of aliens 
visiting or resident in the United States); see also KETTNER, supra note 46, at 49 (discussing the “limited” nature 
of local allegiance); supra note 72 and accompanying text (distinguishing forms of allegiance). 
 82. Elliott Visconsi, Vinculum Fidei: The Tempest and the Law of Allegiance, 20 LAW & LITERATURE 1, 
6 (2008). 
 83. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF KING JOHN act 5, sc. 1, l. 10 (referring to “[s]wearing 
allegiance and the love of soul”). 
 84. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY IV, PART 1 act 3, sc. 2, l. 50.  
 85. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 2, sc. 2, l. 4–5. In other plays, characters warn that “cold hearts 
freeze allegiance,” a metaphor that gains its power from the idea that allegiance is seated within the “heart”; and 
“pray heaven, the King may never find a heart with less allegiance in it!” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE & JOHN 
FLETCHER, HENRY VIII act 1, sc. 2, l. 73–74; id. act 5, sc. 2, l. 93–94. 
 86. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.). The case arose out of controversy of the alienage 
status of the English and Scottish subjects of James I, who united the crowns of Scotland and England following 
his accession to the English throne in 1603. Brought on behalf of the infant Robert Calvin, who claimed the right 
of an English subject, to inherit property in England, it posed a question that Parliament had been unable to 
resolve—whether James’ succession made the Scots subjects of England and the English subjects of Scotland. 
For an overview of the procedural history of Calvin’s Case, see Polly J. Price, Natural Law and Birthright 
Citizenship in Calvin’s Case (1608), 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 80–83 (1997). 
 87. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 385 (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her members and parts, 
are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (noting the duty of allegiance “is written with the 
finger of God in the heart of man”). The link between natural allegiance and the soul of men was part of a broader 
pattern of describing “natural” or “native” laws that are “such as are implanted in us, being written in our hearts.” 
A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, THE GROUNDS AND RUDIMENTS OF LAW AND EQUITY, 
ALPHABETICALLY DIGESTED: CONTAINING A COLLECTION OF RULES AND MAXIMS 1 (1749) (distinguishing 
between “native” and positive law). 
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[Because] [t]his bond of allegiance . . . [or] vinculum fidei [the “bond of 
faith”] . . . bindeth the soul and conscience of every subject . . . . , faith and 
allegiance cannot be framed by policie, nor put into a politick bodie. An oathe 
must be sworne by a natural bodie; homage and fealtie must be done by a 
natural bodie, a politick bodie cannot do it.88 
Allegiance was, in other words, a human sentiment of faith, trust, “love,” 
and loyalty, and only a real flesh and blood person could possess, or attract, those 
sentiments.89 Thus, only the fusion of the politic capacity, or protective power, 
of kingship, “appropriated to the natural capacity” of human representatives, 
could “draweth legiance.”90 And only a “natural bodie” could give it.91  
In the 1780s, the term “citizen” supplanted “subject” as a label for members 
of the American republic.92 In the process, Americans recharacterized the 
 
 88. THOMAS EGERTON, LORD ELLESMERE, THE SPEECH OF THE LORD CHANCELLOR OF ENGLAND, IN THE 
EXCHEQUER CHAMBER, TOUCHING THE POST-NATI 101 (London 1609). 
 89. BACON, supra note 73, at 76 (describing allegiance as “Faith and Love to that Prince and Country” 
where the subject receives his protection); A GENTLEMAN OF THE MIDDLE TEMPLE, supra note 87, at 4 (“The 
end of kings . . . is the well governing of the people, and their strength is in the hearts of their subjects; protection 
and allegiance are reciprocal ties.”). 
 90. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 388–89. 
 91. EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101. This concept of allegiance was, in turn, the key to the case, which 
dealt with the status of the infant Robert Calvin, a Scot born after James assumed the English crown. The fact 
James wore two crowns proved to be the main barrier to finding that James’ succession had made his Scottish 
subjects English subjects. Scots were born under the protection of the Scottish crown, Calvin’s opponents 
argued, and so had no allegiance to the English crown. Coke, however, held this misapprehended the nature of 
the king and allegiance. The “king” was more than just a “crown.” The king was, rather, the fusion of an 
“immortal” legal complex of powers and duties (a political capacity), which was personified (given “natural 
capacity”) through progressive embodiment across a succeeding line of human beings. Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. 
Rep. at 389. This idea of the monarchy as an embodied or personified institution and allegiance as a human 
attachment to that institution, mediated through the real human beings who embodied it, provided the principle 
that resolved the dispute. The antenati (Scots born before James’ accession to the English crown) were born 
under allegiance of James (then styled James VI, King of Scotland). But because at the time of their birth, James 
embodied only the Scottish, but not the English monarchy, the antenati lacked a human connection necessary to 
activate their allegiance to the English crown. Calvin and other postnati (those born after James accession) were 
in a different situation. They born under the protection of the same natural person, James, but at the time of their 
birth he embodied the institution of the monarchy of England as well as Scotland. That meant they and English 
people born under either the protection of James (now also styled James I, King of England) or (far more 
commonly at the time of the decision) his predecessor Queen Elizabeth, had a human relationship with an 
embodiment of English monarchy, thus “knit[ting] [them] together” in what the historian James Kettner called 
a shared “community of allegiance.” See Calvin’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 381 (“As the ligatures or strings do knit 
together the joints of all the parts of the body, so doth ligeance join together the Sovereign and all his subject.”); 
KETTNER, supra note 46, at 23–24. 
 92. Maximilian Koessler, “Subject,” “Citizen,” “National,” and “Permanent Allegiance”, 56 YALE L.J. 
58, 58–59 (1946) (“Although the term ‘citizen’ appears as early as 1777 in the Articles of Confederation, the 
use of ‘subject’ as a synonym did not become obsolete before the enactment of the Federal Constitution 
(1787) . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Even into the early nineteenth century, treatise writers like Chancellor Kent 
considered the terms citizen and subject “in a degree, convertible,” with “subject” a term that described the 
“citizen,” or “republican freeman,” considered in his aspect as a person subject to the laws. See 2 JAMES KENT, 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 258 (E.B. Clayton & James Van Norden eds., 3d ed. 1836) (“[T]he term 
‘citizen’ seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are all equally, with the inhabitants of other 
countries ‘subjects,’ for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and the law of the 
land.”) (note). This particular pattern of usage is the outgrowth of a long tradition of associating “citizen” with 
a member of body politic considered in his “active” capacity, as someone who “serves . . . the city [or polity],” 
while using “subject” to describe a member of a body politic in his passive capacity, as person subject to an 
obligation of obedience to the law. See THOMAS HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN (DE HOMINE AND DE CIVE) 217 
(Bernard Gert ed., 1991) (“[H]erein lies the difference between a free subject and a servant, that he is free indeed, 
who serves only the city . . . .”); id. at 171 (“Each citizen, as also every subordinate civil person, is called the 
subject of him who hath the chief command.”); see also WELLS, supra note 51, at 7–8 (medieval scholastic jurists 
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allegiance once owed to a monarch as the “tie” of a “citizen.”93  
But Gordon Wood writes, “[l]acking our modern appreciation of the force 
of nationalism, eighteenth-century thinkers,” like their seventeenth-century 
counterparts, “had difficulty conceiving of” that tie “in anything other than 
personal terms.”94 And so the tie or fidelity expected of a “citizen” was often 
conceived, as it had long been after Calvin’s Case, as a personal commitment of 
an “individual” to other individuals. Unlike “subjecthood,” though, citizenship 
involved a tie not to a monarch but to one’s fellow citizens or the wider 
community or “society” of a republic.95 
Thus, James Madison, weighing in on a debate over the qualifications of a 
South Carolina candidate during the first congressional election, noted that 
“membership” in a republican community depends on “[the] allegiance which 
[we] owe to that particular society” or “new community.”96 The allegiance to 
the members of that community, he argued, is “primary” and rooted in the “ties 
of nature.”97 The “secondary allegiance we owe to the sovereign established by 
that society.”98  
The tie that made a citizen continued to be described in affective terms. In 
the decades before the revolution, the link between citizenship and affection was 
perhaps articulated most prominently in Emer de Vattel’s Law of Nations, first 
published in an English translation in 1760.  
In his treatment of the duties of “citizens,” Vattel stated that every citizen 
is “obliged to entertain a sincere love for his country.”99 Those who become 
citizens of a country have promised “to procure its safety and advantage as much 
as is in his power: and how can he serve it with zeal, fidelity, and courage if he 
 
believed “‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ are not antitheses but simply two different views of human beings acting in a 
political capacity”; “[t]he word subditi, ‘subjects,’ . . . [did] not mean residents of subordinate territories but 
rather citizens as seekers of favors from their government or in obedience to the laws they have, whether directly 
or indirectly, helped to make.”). 
 93. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 160–64 (1795) (Iredell, J.) (defining a citizen as a “member of the 
society,” meaning one owing “allegiance” to it); id. at 164 (“By allegiance, I mean, that tie by which a citizen 
of the United States is a bound as a member of the society.”); see also SWIFT, supra note 71, at 163 (“Allegiance 
[of an American] is defined to be the tie, that binds the subject to the state . . . .”). 
 94. Gordon S. Wood, Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 
30 (1990).  
 95. Id. (republicans conceived of the “cement” of republican society “in terms of the individual’s 
relationship to some other individual”); id. at 15 (“[R]epublicanism . . . dissolved the older monarchical 
connections and presented people with alternative kinds of attachments, new sorts of social relationships” that 
offered “new conceptions of the individual . . . and the individual’s relationship to the family, the state, and other 
individuals.”). 
 96. James Madison, Citizenship, in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 180, 182 (Charles F. Hobson & 
Robert A. Rutland eds., 1979). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Thus, he argued, birth within a colony established a “primary” allegiance that survived the revolution, 
making inhabitants of the colony citizens upon the Declaration of Independence. Id. 
 99. 1 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE 
CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS § 123, at 53 (London, J. Newberry et al. 1760) (1758) 
(emphasis added); id. § 120, at 52 (“The love and affection a man feels for the state of which he is a member, as 
a necessary consequence of the wise and rational love he owes to himself, since his own happiness is connected 
with that of his country.”). Note Vattel used the term “members” of the state and “citizens” interchangeably. Id. 
§ 213, at 92 (defining “citizens” as the “members of the society”). 
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has not a real love for it?”100 
Vattel echoed a long tradition in medieval Roman law, which, since the 
fourteenth century, had described “citizenship” as “a habitus, a deeply ingrained 
inclination toward civic duty created by birth and fostered by upbringing.”101 
“Born” citizens, in this civil law tradition, were those who exhibited a natural tie 
of a “free” man to their fellow citizens and a natural inclination to aid and 
support their native polity, and this natural tie gave rise to a reciprocal moral 
claim of protection by that polity.102 Foreigners, natives of another city, 
presumptively had an inborn inclination to civic attachment to that polity. But 
naturalization, or adoptive citizenship, could transform that alien habitus. 
“Naturalized citizens,” the historian Charlotte Wells explains, “were bound to 
serve their new state . . . [and early modern European jurists argued that] [i]n 
fulfilling [their] duties, they would gradually develop feelings of love and 
loyalty toward their new home,” thus becoming “true citizens.”103  
In the 1770s and 1780s, Americans described citizens in similar ways: as 
persons with “hearts” and “feelings” or “sentiments”104 who ought to have an 
affective tie to their country.105 The existence of this tie (implied from differing 
 
 100. Id. § 120, at 52. 
 101. WELLS, supra note 51, at 5 (discussing origins of early modern conceptions of citizenship in the work 
of scholastic Italian jurists, including Bartolus de Saxoferrato and Baldus de Ubaldis). 
 102. Id. at 6. 
 103. Id. at 6; id. at 31 (noting the late medieval civilians’ view that “by changing domiciles and devoting 
themselves to the new state—by behaving as citizens—individuals would, in time, be able to replace or at least 
overlay the bond to their original homeland”). As Charlotte Wells recounts, the Italian account of citizenship in 
turn played a formative role in sixteenth century French conceptions of national French citizenship, one that both 
picked up the late medieval association between citizenship and “amicable, almost familial, relations among 
citizens.” Id. at xvii, 1–15. In the seventeenth century, though, paralleling developments in English law, the 
French redirected their understanding of the affective ties of a citizen toward the monarch. “The state no longer 
appeared as a community, like a city; it was now held to be embodied in the person of the monarch. Devotion to 
the prince [accordingly] became the most important duty of the citizen.” Id. at xvii. But, in the eighteenth century, 
the older conception of the citizen—as someone with an affective tie or habitus not just to a monarchy, but to a 
free “community”—experienced a revival, and “helped create a base for both legal and popular understandings 
of citizenship in the years that led up to the [French] Revolution.” Id. at 130, 138. Importantly, as we will return 
to later on, the French revolutionaries also cast back to the sixteenth century position that “the intention to remain 
permanently fixed in France” was an important signal of the prospective citizen’s “loyalty to a community” and, 
therefore, qualification for citizenship. Id. at 140–42; id. at 32–34 (discussing role of domicile in early modern 
French thought); see infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
 104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 202–03 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (discussing the need 
to “familiarize” the national government to the “sight” and “feelings” of the “citizens”); James Wilson in the 
Pennsylvania Convention (Nov. 24, 1787), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 138, 
140 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (referring to the “general sentiment of the citizens of America”); 8 JOURNALS OF 
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 397 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1907) (May 29, 1777) 
(arguing, in a letter directed to “fellow citizens,” that “[i]n free states an unreserved Communication of 
Sentiments, as well as an Union of Interests should always subsist between those who direct, and those who 
delegate to them the Direction of public Affairs”). 
 105. John Adams, Abstract of the Argument (Apr. 1761), in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 134, 135 (L. 
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zoebel eds., 1965) (“The only principles of public conduct that are worthy a 
gentleman, or a man are, to sacrifice estate, ease, health and applause, and even life itself to the sacred calls of 
his country. These manly sentiments in private life make the good citizen, in public life, the patriot and the 
hero.”); John Adams, Letter to Their High Mightiness the States-General of the United Provinces (March 19, 
1782), in 5 THE REVOLUTIONARY DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 251, 251 (Francis 
Wharton ed., 1888) (“What good citizen in the republic, having at heart the interest of his dear country, can 
dissemble or represent to himself without dismay, the sad situation to which we are reduced by the attack equally 
sudden, unjust, and perfidious, of the English?”); see also PICKUS, supra note 80, at 15 (“As with the broader 
discussion of citizenship during the ratification debates, no one [in the ratification and early post–ratification 
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circumstances, including birth or domicile or participation in the Revolution) 
was sometimes described as a moral fact that triggered a reciprocal obligation 
on the part of a republican society to extend membership and the privileges and 
immunities that flowed from it, and other times as a reciprocal duty that flowed 
from the extension of republican liberty to the republic’s members.106  
Sometimes, the “sentiments” of attachment were described as “allegiance.” 
Writing several decades after the Revolution, for example, John Adams 
explained that the independence movement was a revolution in what he termed 
the “sentiments of allegiance”—one that, thanks to the King’s withdrawal of 
protection, involved a revolution in the “minds and hearts” and “affections” of 
the American people.107 Similarly, Justice Iredell in 1795’s Talbot v. Jansen 
characterized the “tie” of a citizen as both “allegiance” and the “fix[ing]” of 
one’s “heart and affections” on a given country.108 
 
period] who argued about naturalization, aliens’ rights, or eligibility for officeholding disputed that attachment 
to America, knowledge of the rights and principles of self–governance, and adoption of the individual habits 
necessary for engagement in public life were the essential ingredients in forming new citizens.”); Wood, supra 
note 94, at 30 (discussing republicans’ efforts to “replac[e] [monarchy’s] social cements with other more 
affective, more emotional, more natural ties”). We are not aware of evidence that this conception of citizen was, 
as it was in France, see supra note 101, indebted to civil law traditions, beyond possible diffusion of that tradition 
by Vattel. Others have argued it reflects a fusion of common law conceptions of allegiance, a revived interest in 
classical thought, and the sentimentalism of the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment. See GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE 
OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 12 (2009) (discussing the influence of 
sentimentalism of Lord Shaftesbury, Francis Hutcheson, and Adam Smith on eighteenth century American 
thought); RICHARD C. SINOPOLI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: LIBERALISM, THE 
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIC VIRTUE 53–62 (1992) (discussing the influence of Anglo–Scottish Enlightenment 
thinkers on American conceptions of citizenship). 
 106. For statements suggesting citizenship as a status that awarded allegiance, see, for example, Madison, 
supra note 96, at 180 (characterizing the “ties of nature” as the foundation of allegiance , which is in turn the 
foundation of citizenship, because the sovereign “cannot make a citizen by any act of his own”); JOEL BARLOW, 
A LETTER TO THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF FRANCE, ON THE DEFECTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791, AND 
THE EXTENT OF THE AMENDMENTS WHICH OUGHT TO BE APPLIED 36 (London, J. Johnson 1793) (suggesting that 
the moral foundation that “entitle[s]” someone to citizenship and its privileges in a given community is the 
“bond” or sentiment of “brotherhood” that person possesses toward the members of that community). These 
claims inverted the relationship between protection and allegiance in the common law, which treated allegiance 
as a “debt of gratitude” for the sovereign’s protection, thus making the sovereign the active party and the subject 
the passive party in the moral relationship. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
24 (6th ed. 1771) (“Allegiance is the duty of all subjects; being the reciprocal tie of the People to the Prince, in 
return for the protection he affords them . . . .” (emphasis added)); JOHN TRUSLER, A CONCISE VIEW OF THE 
COMMON AND STATUTE LAW OF ENGLAND 65 (London, W. Nicoll 1781) (“[Allegiance] is a debt of gratitude, 
which no change of time, place, or circumstances can cancel.”). Americans, however, also sometimes described 
the reciprocal relationship of the duties of citizens and republican sovereign in the traditional way, as a reciprocal 
duty that flowed from the fact of protection. See Alexander Hamilton, A Second Letter from Phocion (April 
1784), in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1782-1786, at 530, 532–34 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) 
(arguing that by accepting “protection” of the state, citizens owe, in turn, a continuing duty of “allegiance,” thus 
implicitly treating protection as genesis of the duty of allegiance, and allegiance as a debt of gratitude). 
 107. Letter from John Adams to Hezekiah Niles, 13 February 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders. 
archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-6854 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020). In the years before and after 
ratification, Americans disagreed about whether allegiance, as opposed to some other term, was the appropriate 
label for the “political tie” of a citizen. Compare Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 141 (1795) (argument of counsel 
for Talbot) (“Allegiance and citizenship, differ, indeed, in almost every characteristic. . . . Citizenship is the 
character of equality; allegiance is a badge of inferiority. Citizenship is constitutional; allegiance is personal. 
Citizenship is freedom; allegiance is servitude.”), with SWIFT, supra note 71, at 163 (allegiance to the United 
States, “derived to us from the oath of fealty, adopted in the feudal system, is materially varied from it, and 
instead of being a badge of slavery and vassalage, is an honourable acknowledgement of subjection to legal 
government”). 
 108. Talbot, 3 U.S. at 163–64 (Iredell, J., concurring). 
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Some, like Alexander Hamilton would (in ways that paralleled descriptions 
of the habitus of a citizen in the civil law tradition) describe the “tie” of a 
“citizen” using (patriarchal) familial metaphors: “A dispassionate and virtuous 
citizen . . . will regard his own country as a wife, to whom he is bound to be 
exclusively faithful and affectionate, and he will watch with a jealous attention 
every propensity of his heart to wander towards a foreign country, which he will 
regard as a mistress that may pervert his fidelity, and mar his happiness.”109 
Similarly, Abigail Adams, a feminist republican, would lay her claim to the 
equal “character of a citizen” alongside her husband through the following verse, 
which analogized the affection of a citizen to the affection toward families: 
My Passions too can Sometimes Soar above, 
The Houshold task assign’d me, can extend 
Beyond the Narrow Sphere of families, 
And take great States into th’ expanded Heart 
As well as yours.110  
Or, wrote Benjamin Rush, “patriotism is as much a virtue as justice, and is 
as necessary for the support of societies as natural affection is for support of 
families.”111 It is accordingly the “duty of every citizen of the Republic,” to 
“love his fellow creatures in every part of the world, but he must cherish with a 
more intense and peculiar affection, the citizens [of his own state] and the United 
States.”112  
James Madison described citizenship similarly. “Hearken not to the 
unnatural voice,” wrote Madison in Federalist 14, “which tells you that the 
people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can 
no longer live together as members of the same family . . . can no longer be 
fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.”113 
Others would characterize the tie of a “citizen” as, simply, a social or 
creedal “affection” or “attachment.” Members of a single sovereign “union,” or 
“citizens,” wrote John Jay in Federalist 2 and 5, are “joined in affection” and 
share a “sentiment” of “attach[ment] to the same principles of government.” 114 
 
 109. Alexander Hamilton, For the Gazette of the United States (March-April 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 1793-1793, at 267, 267 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969). 
 110. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, 10 January 1783, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://www.mass 
hist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17830110aa&hi=1&query=father&tag=text&archive=all&rec=84&star
t=80&numRecs=222 (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).  
 111. Benjamin Rush, To His Fellow Countrymen: On Patriotism (Oct. 20, 1773), in 1 LETTERS OF BENJAMIN 
RUSH 83, 83 (L.H. Butterfield ed., 1951). 
 112. Benjamin Rush, Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic (1798), in THE SELECTED WRITINGS 
OF BENJAMIN RUSH 84, 87–96 (Dagobert D. Runes ed., 1947). 
 113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 144 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (1788) (emphasis added). 
For other examples of equating the tie of a citizen-subject and body politic to familial ties, see James Otis, A 
Vindication of the British Colonies (1765), in COLLECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES OTIS 183, 207 
(Richard Samuelson ed., 2015) (“Our allegiance is natural, and if this be admitted of each individual in a colony, 
as it must be, it would be strange to deny a natural relation between two whole bodies, between all the respective 
parts of which a natural relation is admitted. Society is certainly natural . . . . As there is a natural relation 
between father and son, so is there between their two families; and so is there between a mother-state or 
metropolis, and its colonies.”).  
 114. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 91–94 (John Jay) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (characterizing the 
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“A citizen of America may be considered in two points of view,” said James 
Wilson, “as a citizen of the general government, and as a citizen of the particular 
state in which he may reside.”115 A citizen of a state is, in turn, one who has 
formed “local habits and attachments.”116 George Mason, similarly, described 
the “invisible principle” of republican government as “the love, the affection, 
the attachment of the citizens to their laws, their freedoms, and their country.”117  
Still others equated allegiance with “benevolence.” Thus, in Talbot, Justice 
Paterson, after defining a citizen as someone owing allegiance, noted that one of 
the defendants, Ballard, accused of aiding a foreign country, “was, and still is, a 
citizen of the United States.”118 “[P]erchance,” though, said Justice Paterson, “he 
should be a citizen of the world.” That “is a creature of the imagination, and far 
too refined for any republic of ancient or modern times.”119 “If however, he be 
a citizen of the world, the character bespeaks universal benevolence”—not just 
benevolence to a particular community¾which is no less inconsistent with 
“roving on the ocean in quest of plunder.”120 
Employing the same association of citizenship with benevolence directed 
at a community, the American Mary Wollstonecraft, Judith Sergeant Murray, 
would, in her collection of essays and plays The Gleaner, metaphorically equate 
philanthropy itself with “citizenship” of the world, meaning a “univer[sal]” 
attachment of the “heart”: 
Philanthropy, I know thy form divine, 
Godlike benignity and truth are thine; 
A citizen of the wide globe thou art, 
 
“citizen” as a member of a “united people” who share a “tie” or “sentiment” of “attachment to the cause of 
Union” and “attach[ment] to the same principles of government”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 5, at 101 (John Jay) 
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (describing the “people” of a united sovereignty, which Jay also characterizes in 
other papers as the “citizens,” as people “joined in affection”); see, e.g., Noah Pickus, “Hearken Not to the 
Unnatural Voice”: Publius and the Artifice of Attachment, in DIVERSITY AND CITIZENSHIP: REDISCOVERING 
AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 63 (Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn & Susan Dunn eds., 1996) (discussing the theme of 
fostering the “attachment” of citizens to a national union in The Federalist Papers). 
 115. Robert Yates’s Minutes of the Secret Debates of the Federal Convention (May 25, 1787), in 1 THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 389, 445–46 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1901). 
 116. Id. at 446 (emphasis added) (“When the state citizen acts as citizen of the ‘general government,’” he 
must “lay aside” those local attachments and “act for the general good of the whole.”).   
 117. Georgia’s first constitution thus recited that “[t]his Congress, therefore, as the representatives of the 
people, with whom all power originates, and for whose benefit all government is intended, [is] deeply impressed 
with a sense of duty to their constituents, of love to their country, and inviolable attachment to the liberties of 
America.” See Constitution of the Provincial Congress of the Colony of Georgia (Apr. 15, 1776), in A TREATISE 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF GEORGIA § 52, at 61 (Walter McElreath ed., 1912). Similarly, its naturalization act, 
required applicants to demonstrate their “attachment to the Liberties and Independence of the United States of 
America.” An Act for Preventing Improper or Disafected Persons Emigrating from Other Places, and Becoming 
Citizens of This State, in 19 THE COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA pt. 2, at 162, 162–66 (Allen 
D. Candler ed., 1911); see also Letter from John Brown Cutting to Thomas Jefferson (September 16, 1788), in 
13 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 608, 608–13 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956) (noting no neighboring nation 
has “aught to fear from us” other than the risk their subjects may “voluntarily . . . commute themselves into free 
citizens and thus become attached to the first empire that mankind have ever erected on the solid foundation of 
truth, reason or common sense”). 
 118. Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. 133, 153 (1795).  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Expansive as the universe thy heart . . . .121 
Sometimes, the duty of citizen was equated with “devotion.”122 Or, the tie 
was described in new ways that harkened to the classical vita activa or public-
regarding “virtue” of an ancient Roman citizen.123 Classical sources, though, 
associated the virtues expected of a citizen with martial virtues—the virtue of 
the citizen-solider, courage, and self-sacrifice for the good of the city.124 But 
Americans, notes Gordon Wood, described the “virtue” expected of a citizen as 
“affability and sociability” toward fellow citizens or (in James Wilson’s words) 
“the natural and graceful expression of the social virtues.”125  
To be a “citizen” was thus to occupy of a moral position in relation to a 
particular community or its creedal values, defined variously as allegiance, 
benevolence, affection, love, devotion, sociability, or active attachment.  
Law, of course, would not (indeed could not) compel this affection in fact, 
but (in an echo of the Italian civilians’ concept of how participation in republican 
institutions imparts a habitus) republican institutions would help foster it.  
This was, indeed, one major theme of The Federalist Papers. As Hamilton 
put it in Federalist 27, the object of the new Constitution was, by ensuring sound 
governance, to “conciliate the respect and attachment” of “citizens” for the new 
“Union” by “touch[ing] the most sensible chords and put[ting] in motion the 
most active strings of the human heart.”126 
 
 121. JUDITH SARGENT MURRAY, No. XVI Eulogium on Philanthropy—A Letter to the Gleaner from Robert 
Amiticus, in 1 THE GLEANER: A MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTION 149, 149 (1798). For more on the Enlightenment 
tradition of equating cosmopolitan “citizenship” with “civic sentiments” of “friendship” directed toward 
humankind, rather than a portion of it, see Ursula Vogel, Cosmopolitan Loyalties and Cosmopolitan Citizenship 
in the Enlightenment, in POLITICAL LOYALTY AND THE NATION-STATE 17, 45–49 (Michael Waller & Andrew 
Linklater eds., 2003). 
 122. Thus, wrote Wilson, “[o]n the citizen under a republican government, a third duty . . . is strictly 
incumbent. Whenever a competition unavoidably takes place between his interest and that of the publick, to the 
latter the former must be the devoted sacrifice.” James Wilson, Lectures on Law, in 2 THE WORKS OF THE 
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON 438–39 (Bird Wilson ed., 1804); see also Alexander Hamilton, A Letter from 
Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New York (Jan. 1–27, 1784), in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 483, 483–97 (equating abrogation of “allegiance” to one’s country with 
“devot[ion] . . . to a foreign jurisdiction”). 
 123. For a discussion of the influence of classical idea of the viva activa of a citizen on early modern 
citizenship discourse, see WELLS, supra note 51, at 1–9; Wood, supra note 94, at 23 (the classical “virtue” of 
the “citizen” required “sacrifice [of] . . . private interests for the sake of the community” and “active” 
participation in the political life of the state). 
 124. Wood, supra note 94, at 30. 
 125. Id. at 31 (“[The] new modern [republican] virtue was associated with affability and sociability, with 
love and benevolence, indeed, with a new emphasis on politeness, which James Wilson and his friend William 
White defined in 1768 as ‘the natural and graceful expression of the social virtues.’”) (quoting Stephen A. 
Conrad, Polite Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson’s Republican Theory, 1984 SUP. 
CT. REV. 359, 361 (1984)); id. at 30 (“These natural affinities, the love and benevolence that men felt toward 
each other, were akin to traditional classical republican virtue” of ancient “citizens” but “not identical to it.”); 
see also WOOD, supra note 105, at 12 (noting that in revolutionary American thought, “[v]irtue became less the 
harsh and martial self-sacrifice of antiquity and more the modern willingness to get along with others for the 
sake of peace and prosperity”). 
 126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis added); 
see also SINOPOLI, supra note 105, at 102 (“Madison and Hamilton contend that the requisite civic dispositions, 
the sentiments and habits needed to sustain a liberal polity, are reasonably likely to develop under the proposed 
constitutional government. . . . [I]n time, the sentiments of allegiance, which at present principally accrued to 
state governments, would be transferred, in some degree, to the national one” thanks to “the soundness and 
durability” of national administration); PICKUS, supra note 80, at 38 (“[Hamilton] sought to foster a national 
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2.  Corroborating Corpus Evidence 
The forgoing examples suggest “citizen” conveyed a normative 
expectation of affective attachment to a body politic, limiting the term to the 
only class of objects that possess the capacity for such attachment, natural 
persons.  
We employed two methods to corroborate this claim. First, using Brigham 
Young University’s Corpus of Founding Era American English (“COFEA”) 
database, we looked for adjectives that collocate to the left of citizen, since these 
are likely to modify citizen and thus suggest qualities or attributes associated 
with citizenship.127 When we ran such test, and excluded adjectives indicating 
nationality (like American), the top adjectives that collocate, in a statistically 
significant fashion, within four words to the left of citizen, include: Natural-
born, naturalized, virtuous, privileged, meritorious, patriotic, reputable, 
illustrious, respectable, native, wealthy, private, dutiful, industrious, honest, 
peaceable, ambitious, zealous, obscure, deserving, worthy, free, valuable, 
modest, and benevolent.  
Of these, several—valuable, useful, patriotic, and zealous—are suggestive 
of the affective or virtue-oriented concept of citizenship. A number of these 
words—virtuous, honest, patriotic, zealous—are modifiers for human beings. 
And some of these terms, like patriotic and zealous, collocate with the words 
“sentiments” or “attachment.”128  
We then turned to look at the keywords “virtuous” and “citizen” in context 
to see if that context reveals what normative expectations, exactly, were 
associated with citizenship. Here, though, we found the overwhelming majority 
of KWIC concordance lines were indeterminate. Of two hundred randomly 
concordance lines, only a little over one-sixth (or thirty-five) of these provided 
context that allowed a reasonable inference of the “virtue” of a citizen. Of, these, 
in twenty (or slightly more than half the time) the speaker associated the “virtue” 
of a citizen with zeal, patriotism, attachment, or affection toward a political 
community. The remainder associated the citizen’s virtue with being 
“dispassionate”—in the older sense of other- or public-regarding, as opposed to 
self-interested—sobriety, courage, or industriousness.  
This is all certainly suggestive. But what this evidence also indicates is that 
 
sentiment that supported the Constitution, and less strongly the government in power . . . . For Hamilton, the 
success of the government depended on its capacity to work its way into the daily sensibilities of the citizenry.”). 
Hamilton’s stated aim echoes Vattel’s advice to statesmen. See 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 119, at 52 (arguing 
that the great goal of statecraft is “to inspire the citizens with an ardent love for their country”). The link between 
allegiance, sentiment, and citizenship in eighteenth century discourse, we note, did not go unnoticed by later 
observers. In State ex rel. M’Cready v. Hunt, 2 Hill 1, 209–82 (S.C. App. L. & Eq. 1834), a case that arose out 
of the Nullification Crisis, Justice O’Neill, on a lengthy disquisition on the origins and history of the link between 
allegiance and citizenship, grudgingly conceded that “[i]n common discourse, perhaps, there has been some 
vague notion of a feeling or sentiment connected with this term.” Id. at 278. 
 127. We ran a search for collocate “*/adj” within four words to the left of “citizen*/n” and set minimum 
frequency to five. We ranked outcomes based on the mutual information score and discarded outcomes with a 
mutual information score of less than 3.0. 
 128. Patriotic is one of the top twenty collocates of sentiments, with a mutual information score of 4.17. 
Attachment is one of the top twenty collocates of zealous, with a mutual information score of 5.36. 
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citizenship presupposed a rich set of normative content that writers assumed 
“citizen,” by itself, conveyed. The authors accordingly didn’t always feel the 
need to make that content explicit—the word itself could convey normative 
content without needing to spell them out in surrounding text. The result, though, 
is that simple collocation and KWIC analysis are suggestive, but hardly decisive, 
windows into the presuppositions that sentences using “citizen” conveyed. 
A different approach is taking an immersive deep dive into use of “citizen” 
by reading widely in the period. This is a difficult and time-consuming 
undertaking, but one plausible way to make this tractable is to identify a body of 
representative texts that are particularly likely, on a closer examination, to reveal 
the normative presuppositions that ordinary users of the English language would 
pick up.  
Our solution is to turn to literary sources of the period, collected in Gale’s 
Eighteenth Century Online (“ECCO”) Literature and Language database. We do 
so for a counterintuitive reason: “Citizen” appears in a large number of works in 
this database across the 1770s and 1780s; but in a given work, it was used 
sparingly—the works we reviewed used the term only a couple of times in a 
volume. That’s actually useful: When used infrequently in a work, the term, 
when it appears, was used with intention—because its normative or descriptive 
content reinforced the themes of the passage it occurs in. As a result, literary 
sources are a valuable window into the presupposed content of citizen. 
We examined works in ECCO published in four periods: 1770–71, 1778–
80, 1786–87, and 1789. In all, we examined 249 uses across 158 works. Of these, 
52 uses, or 20%, appeared in contexts that did not shed light on the normative 
presuppositions that “citizen” conveyed. (These contexts often involved the use 
of “citizen” when distinguishing between the geographic origins of two 
characters. For example, an author would employ “citizen” to communicate 
someone was a “native” of a different place (most frequently a city) than another 
character.)  
The remaining uses fell into five categories. In the first, citizen was chosen 
as a descriptor of someone who might also be termed a “burgomeister” or a 
“bourgeois”—a propertied man of status who lives in a city (generally of 
London) and is associated with commercial trades. This use of the term traded 
on its ancient use of “citizen” to mean a freeholder of a medieval city.129 
Second, citizen was used in passages in which the character or person so 
described was presented as a proper object of an expectation of loyalty, 
affection, or patriotic attachment to his or her polity.  
Third, citizen appeared in passages conveying that someone possessed 
certain other virtues. For example, citizen was used in passages describing the 
status-holder as sober or respectable or “useful” member of society, signaling 
that citizen was associated with an expectation of performing civic, public-
regarding duties. 
 
 129. Koessler, supra note 92, at 60 (discussing this medieval sense of the term, as an inhabitant of a city or 
town free from feudal obligations). 
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Fourth, citizen also appeared in passages emphasizing someone was an 
enjoyer of rights or privileges of a free man, thus indicating an association of 
citizen with liberties or legal privilege. 
Finally, citizen was used in passages relating to the relative rank or status 
of different persons. Thus, a passage might distinguish a noble from the 
“common mass of citizens.” Or the term citizen would be used in a passage that 
emphasizes that someone was, by virtue of their citizenship, worthy of or due 
respect.  
Of these, one set of uses—to mean a “burgomeister” or propertied urban 
dweller—is plainly different from the term “citizen” used in Article III. When 
that use (which appeared 19% of the time) is excluded from the ECCO data set, 
thereby limiting the set to uses relating to a member of a republic rather than a 
city, uses linking citizenship and civic virtue amounted to a little over three-
quarters of the remaining non-neutral uses. Across all uses indicating the 
“virtue” of a citizen, though, nearly two-thirds of these appeared in contexts 
emphasizing citizens were expected to have an affective attachment to their 
community. In all, uses that communicated an expectation of affective 
attachment to a community were the most common of all non-neutral uses 
relating to a member of a republic—appearing with twice the frequency of the 
next most common use.130 
The evidence also tends to suggest authors viewed each of the senses 
relating to a member of a republic—senses communicating an expectation of 
affective attachment, expectations of other civic virtues, and enjoyment of 
privileges or generic status—as complementary or related. For example, in 
works that used the term in more than one sense (about 20% of the works in our 
data set), every work that used the term to connote enjoyment of privileges also 
used the term to signify affective attachment to a community. Similarly, in works 
that used the term in more than one sense, 90% of works that used the term at 
least once to connote civic virtue other than affective attachment also used the 
term in an affective sense. The fact it was relatively common for the same author 
to employ these senses together in a single work tends to suggest authors 
understood the word to convey, simultaneously, each of these meanings. 
“Citizen,” when used in relation to a member of a republic, signified an enjoyer 
of status and rights, who was the subject of a reciprocal expectation of public 
virtue and social attachment to the right-granting political community.  
These findings are consistent with the tentative evidence of concordance-
based analysis. And together with the pattern of usage of the framers and other 
public figures in the 1780s and 1790s, it gives rise to a solid inference: that in 
common parlance, “citizen,” particularly when used as a term a member of a 
 
 130. After excluding neutral uses and uses in the sense of burgomeister from the set, we were left with a set 
of 150 uses in 97 works. In this set, uses indicating an expectation of affective attachment appeared half the time 
and at least once in 61% of all remaining works. By contrast, uses conveying an expectation of other virtues 
appeared 26.5% of the time and at least once in 31% of remaining works; uses communicating the right–
conferring nature of citizenship appeared 12.7% of the time and at least once in 17.5% of remaining works; and 
uses conveying relative status appeared 11% of the time and at least once in 15.4% of remaking works.  
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republic rather than city, conveyed a normative expectation of an affective tie to 
a concrete society or political community. It was a tie of “citizens” that English-
speakers, in the 1770s and 1780s, hadn’t assigned a commonly accepted label or 
linguistic formula—but it was nonetheless a core part of the semantic content of 
“citizen.” 
3.  “Negative Evidence” 
Up to this point, the evidence we’ve offered is positive—evidence of the 
concept that the citizenship positively conveyed. It was a term that conveyed an 
aspirational expectation of affective attachment to a community or its creedal 
values. Because it was a term defined in relation to the capacity for forming 
complex social ties, its meaning contained a sortal restriction that limited the 
term to natural persons. 
A last line evidence is negative—contemporaneous statements about what 
citizenship in 1787 is not. Reviewing evidence that the term was not applied to 
certain objects or categories is essential. Terms can sometimes attract a tradition 
of figurative usage. The word “kill” is a verb whose root object is an animate 
object, something that can “live” and “die.” However, we frequently use the term 
in relation to inanimate objects—we might say that a flaw in an electrical system 
“killed” (shorted out) an electrical appliance. Thanks to this tradition, “kill” is 
ambiguous—it can potentially apply not just to animate objects but inanimate 
ones, as well. As a result, we have to disambiguate the word by looking at the 
context in which the word is used. 
This raises the question whether “citizen” might have been like that—a 
word that had, in 1787, developed a tradition of figurative application to 
inanimate or abstract objects.131 As a result, inquiring whether the term was used 
other than in its literal sense is an important part of our larger inquiry. That 
evidence can both correlate our claims about its literal meaning and eliminate, 
at the same time, the possibility the term had developed a tradition of figurative 
or metaphorical usage. 
One context in which speakers may have had occasion to consider applying 
“citizen” to inanimate or abstract objects involved the relation of the term to 
corporations. Corporations were sometimes conceived of a “thing” or 
“franchise,” which shareholders “owned.”132 They were simultaneously 
reified—that is, treated in law as if they were a real “person.”133 
The corporation, in the eighteenth century, was even sometimes the object 
of terms that had accreted a tradition of figurative use—like the term 
“inhabitant,” meaning an ordinary domiciliary. A corporation was thus an 
 
 131. For a discussion of “abstract objects” in the philosophy of language, see Grandy, supra note 31 (noting 
a corporation or a “government” is an “abstract object,” and discussing debates in the philosophy of language 
about the status of such objects). 
 132. 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 267 (“A corporation is a franchise possessed by one or more individuals, who 
subsist as a body politic . . . .”). 
 133. Id. (the corporate “body politic” is an “invisible and intangible being” that is “vested, by the policy of 
the law, with the capacity . . . of acting, in several respects . . . as a single individual”). 
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“inhabitant” of a place it owned land and conducted its affairs.134 And, as a 
result, if we were attempting to divine the original meaning of a text employing 
“inhabitant,” we would have to investigate whether the term was used in a sense 
that conveyed a literal or figurative meaning before excluding the possibility the 
term embraced corporations. 
We can find no evidence, however, that citizen was used figuratively to 
describe corporations. In Calvin’s Case, Coke defined subjects as persons owing 
allegiance—and specified that allegiance was a commitment that can only be 
given by a “natural bodie,” that is, someone with a “soul.”135 Corporations, said 
Coke just a few years later in the Case of Sutton’s Hospital, “had no souls,” and 
therefore “could not commit treason.”136 The plain implication was that 
corporations were not “subjects.”  
Fast-forward to the 1780s and early 1790s, and the seventeenth-century 
refusal to recognize corporations as an object of state membership-related terms, 
like alien or subject, persisted. Thus, in his debate with Alexander Hamilton over 
the first national bank, Thomas Jefferson objected that corporations allow 
foreigners to evade restrictions on alien ownership of property.137 Hamilton 
responded by appealing to ordinary meaning of the “law of alienage”—meaning 
the law comprehensively governing not just the status and rights of aliens, but 
the law of subjecthood and citizenship.138 That law “does not apply to 
corporations,” he said, because “they have no country.”139  
In this, Hamilton was largely talking past Jefferson. Jefferson did not 
disagree—he wasn’t claiming corporations with alien shareholders were 
“aliens.” Rather, he was making a practical point that “alien subscribers” can 
evade restrictions on alien property ownership through the device of the 
corporation, precisely because the corporate person is not subject to the law of 
alienage.140 In either case, both speakers assumed that only the natural persons 
who form the corporation are appropriate recipients of terms dealing with 
“alienage.” 
 
 134. Rex v. Gardner (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 977, 977 (K.B.) (“[C]orporations, having lands, may be rated, and 
have been considered as inhabitants in respect of such lands.”); 2 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 697, 703 (1642) (stating that “every corporation and body politicke . . . having lands” are considered 
inhabitants of such lands). 
 135. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.) (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her 
members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (the duty of allegiance is “written 
with the finger of God in the heart of man”); EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101 (explaining that under Coke’s 
reasoning, only a “natural bodie” can give allegiance). 
 136. The Case of Sutton’s Hospital, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (K.B.) (finding that corporations are 
“invisible, immortal, and rest[] only in the intendment and consideration of the law . . . . They cannot commit 
treason, nor be . . . outlawed, nor excommunicate, for they have no souls”). 
 137. Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 15, 1791), 
in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 91, 91 (Matthew St. Clair 
Clark & David A. Hall eds., 1832). 
 138. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bank of the United States (Feb. 23, 1791), 
in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 137, at 95, 100.  
 139. Id. 
 140. Jefferson, supra note 137, at 91 (referring to “alien subscribers” of the national bank) (emphasis 
added). 
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Similarly, every major treatise after subdividing “persons” into “natural” 
and “artificial” categories presented citizenship or alienage as statuses 
applicable to natural persons while treating artificial persons, or corporations, as 
a topic apart from the law of natural persons, including the law of alienage.141 
Major eighteenth-century treatments of the law of corporations, like Stewart 
Kyd’s Treatise on the Law of Corporations, also do not discuss the law of 
subjecthood or citizenship—indicating their writers thought this area of law was 
inapplicable to corporations.142  
Treaties between the United States and foreign countries dealt with the 
duties or rights of corporations apart from the rights of the contracting states’ 
citizens or subjects.143 Similarly, Americans and other English speakers, when 
enumerating subjects of a law, would carefully distinguish “citizens” from 
“corporations.”144 
Of course, focusing simply on the application of “citizen” to corporations 
may be missing important semantic evidence. Corporations in the eighteenth 
century, after all, were conceptualized differently than modern corporations. As 
Julian Ku notes, they were sometimes treated as something more akin to “arms 
of the state”—in effect, a kind of quasi-governmental entity.145 One, however, 
could imagine a pattern of figurative use of “citizen” applied to abstractions or 
things that have been uniformly attributed to the qualities of private persons. If 
so, it would be a term whose conventional usage would not apply to eighteenth-
century corporations, which were often viewed as quasi-governmental entities, 
 
 141. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *354–63 (treating of the laws of alienage); id. at *455–73 
(treating artificial persons, after noting that the treatise’s previous sections, including alienage statuses, 
“considered persons in their natural capacities”). This tradition persisted long after the Supreme Court began 
referring to corporations as citizens of states for certain purposes in the antebellum period. See 1 BOUVIER, supra 
note 36, at 57–84 (dividing persons into natural and artificial persons, and then treating statuses of citizen, 
subject, and alien as statuses of natural persons); 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 267–316 (treating corporations under 
the heading “rights of persons,” but treating corporations separately from natural persons, and confining 
discussion of alienage statuses to natural persons only). 
 142. 1 STEWART KYD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, at vii–xiv (1793) (table of contents). 
 143. Julian G. Ku, The Limits of Corporate Rights Under International Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 729, 739 
(2012) (collecting authorities); see also Marcantel, supra note 38, at 239–41 (collecting structural evidence from 
some early state constitutions suggesting a distinction between citizens and corporations). 
 144. See, e.g., 1 KYD, supra note 142, passim (using “citizen” only in relation to members of a corporation—
usually a municipal corporation, consistent with the term’s older sense of a freeman of a city—never to the 
corporation itself).  
 145. Ku, supra note 143, at 738 (“[T]he modern corporation probably traces its origin back only to the mid-
nineteenth century. Earlier corporations, such as those [meant] . . . to carry out state monopolies . . . were special 
dispensations from the government . . . . In some ways, those corporations were understood to simply be 
privately financed arms of the state.”); id. at 739 (as a result, in treaties in the early nineteenth century and late 
eighteenth century, “[c]orporations were not . . . typically considered nationals needing protection, but more like 
agents acting on behalf of or under state authority”); WINKLER, supra note 38, at 48 (“In Blackstone’s 
day, . . . corporations more clearly straddled the divide between public and private. They had unambiguously 
private aspects, in that they were financed and managed by private parties. Yet they were also inherently public. 
They could only be formed by charter granted by the government, and the government would not grant one 
unless the corporation had a public purpose. . . . Corporations had to serve the commonweal . . . .”); Gregory A. 
Mark, Comment, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 
1443–47, 1452–53, 1482 (1987) (discussing the early concept of the corporation as a “derivative tool of the 
state”); JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1780-1790, at 17 (1970) (“From the 1780’s well into the mid-nineteenth century the most frequent and 
conspicuous use of the business corporation . . . was for one particular type of enterprise, that which we later 
called the public utility . . . .”). 
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but would embrace the modern corporation, which is pervasively described as a 
wholly private “person.”146 
However, of the 249 uses of “citizen” we reviewed on ECCO, we could not 
find a single instance applying the term figuratively to any abstract objects or 
non-human objects. Outside of ECCO, the only figurative use from the framing 
period that we have identified is Judith Sergeant Murray’s characterization of 
“philanthropy” as a “citizen of the world,” discussed earlier.147 Otherwise, every 
use in which the identity of the term’s referent could be unambiguously 
ascertained used “citizen” in relation to a specific natural person or individual 
members of a group of natural persons.148  
The evidence, in other words, suggests popular usage of “citizen” was 
confined to its literal sense: a status reserved for animate objects capable of 
forming complex social ties or sentiments, namely human beings. 
C.  ELIMINATING A COMPETING SENSE OF “CITIZEN” 
The previous Subparts showed that citizen’s 1787 meaning included a 
sortal restriction limiting the term to persons with capacity for social ties, or 
natural persons. After ratification, American courts articulated another meaning 
of a state “citizen”—not as a status entitling one to privileges and immunities 
under the domestic law of a given state, but as a term for a person who, simply, 
“belongs” to a state in the eyes of international law by virtue of subjection to 
what we would term the state’s “general jurisdiction.”  
This sense is less restrictive—because its sorting criteria is, simply, 
“subjection to the general jurisdiction of a state,” it can encompass any objects, 
including artificial persons, which, while lacking sentiments, happen to satisfy 
the requirements for exercise of “general jurisdiction.” As such, it would do no 
damage to this sense of the term to extend it to modern corporations, which are, 
of course, proper objects of the law of general jurisdiction. 
In this Subpart, we complete the picture by showing that this use developed 
in America only after ratification (and even then it remained an obscure 
specialist sense). The historical and collocation evidence above itself, indeed, 
tends to demonstrate this—in the 1780s, citizen was pervasively described in 
terms of affective or solidaristic, not just territorial, ties. And, thus, the word 
collocated most strongly with terms that were consistent with having either 
public virtue or a tie or affection to a community, rather than terms that describe 
 
 146. Mark, supra note 145, at 1447; id. at 1442–47 (tracing the emergence, after the rise of general 
incorporation statutes, of “the conception of the corporation as a real person, which saw the corporation as an 
autonomous, self–directed entity in which rights inhered”); id. at 1464–83 (discussing the post–realist “rhetorical 
convention” of describing the corporation as such). 
 147. See MURRAY, supra note 121, at 149. 
 148. In the ECCO database, we coded all uses that associated citizenship with affective attachment to a 
community as uses of the term to refer to natural persons. We coded other uses as references to natural persons 
when the passage in which the word appeared either (1) used the term in relation to a specific person or persons, 
or (2) described the “citizens” at issue as having attributes that could only belong to human beings, including 
ethnicity, physical characteristics (“hearts” or “blood,” for example), ancestry or progeny, or emotional states. 
Twenty percent of the uses in the ECCO database were too generic to support any conclusion about the identity 
of the class of referents. 
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a simple jurisdictionally relevant relationship.  
Below, Subpart C.1 fills in the picture further, by tracing the somewhat 
unexpected source of the alternative concept of state citizen from a post-
ratification line of prize and capture cases in the British Admiralty at the turn of 
the nineteenth century. As such, this new concept of citizen is not part of the 
term’s pre-ratification public meaning.149 
This is not to say that “citizen,” in 1787, had no relationship to the 
territorial contacts we, today, associate with general jurisdiction. Territorial 
contacts, we show in Subpart C.2, were legally relevant because they served as 
a proxy for assessing whether a candidate for “citizenship” had formed the 
requisite social “attachments” that were citizenship’s prerequisite. As a result, 
the territorial contacts that mattered to citizenship reflected, and were cabined 
by, the fact that “citizen” was a status restricted to natural persons. 
1.  The Post-Ratification Rise of “Domiciliary Citizenship” in Antebellum 
International Law 
In the eighteenth century, courts commonly adjudicated concepts of 
citizenship or subjecthood in “prize and capture” cases. During declared wars, 
states licensed private ships, or “privateers,” to confiscate the goods of the 
enemy. But, in some cases, victims of confiscation disputed whether their 
property was a proper target of privateering, which reached only the goods with 
a “hostile” or enemy “character.”150 
In England, courts held that the “enemy character will attach to a subject 
or neutral who carries on business in the enemy’s country.”151 However, writes 
William Holdsworth, this principle was not established “as a definite legal 
principle” until a series of cases authored by Sir William Scott for the British 
High Court of Admiralty in the late 1790s.152  
In The Vigilantia,153 decided in 1798, Scott held someone domiciled in a 
foreign state for purposes of trade, even if not a naturalized “subject” of that 
state, was “stamped with the national character” of that state in the eyes of 
international law and therefore a “subject” of that state under the laws of prize 
 
 149. In Great Britain, there was a separate tradition, dating back to the Middle Ages, of using the term citizen 
as term for a freeman of a city or town located within a state, as opposed to a member of a state; this was a use 
(because the status of freemen was awarded based on guild membership) that was also associated with 
tradesmen. Johnson’s Dictionary defined these as the exclusive sense of the word in British English in early 
editions. In the 1785 edition, he suggested it had expanded to encompass not just freemen, but all inhabitants of 
cities and towns. See 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON, DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (6th ed. 1785) (adding, for 
the first time, “inhabitant; dweller of any place” as a sense of citizen, in addition to “freeman of a city” or “man 
of trade”). We find no evidence this line of usage contributed to the popular or technical meaning of “state” 
citizens in America during or after the framing period. 
 150. The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 278–80 (1814). 
 151. 9 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 101 (1926). Holdsworth traces the evolution 
of the principle back to precursors in 1677, but notes that it was established only “as a definite legal principle” 
at the end of the eighteenth century. See id. at 101 n.2. 
 152. Id. 
 153. The Vigilantia (1798) 165 Eng. Rep. 74, 79 (Adm.); see also The Indian Chief (1801) 165 Eng. Rep. 
367, 371 (Adm.) (holding the “national character” of a trading domicile is “adventitious” and easily reverts, 
upon the merchant’s departure with intent to return to his native country). 
206 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:169 
and war, subjecting their property to lawful confiscation like any other subject 
of an enemy power.154 
Scott’s decision was a workaround a settled piece of English law of 
subjecthood. Common law allegiance was perpetual—thus, British domiciliaries 
in foreign countries remained “subjects” of their native land.155 Yet, if English 
domiciliaries in enemy foreign countries remained British subjects, their 
property was not the property of an “enemy” and thus not subject to confiscation 
during wartime. The concept of an acquired “national character” through a 
permanent trading domicile abroad created a workaround. It created a form of 
quasi-expatriation for purposes of the law of prize and capture. 
The doctrine of perpetual allegiance, James Kettner notes, clashed with 
Americans’ embrace, during the American Revolution, of citizenship acquired 
through “volitional [change in] allegiance.”156 Even so, American courts 
remained uncertain about the continued vitality of the common law doctrine, at 
least on the international plane.157  
As a result, the concept of foreign citizenship by domicile for purposes of 
prize and capture had the same utility for antebellum American courts that it had 
for their English counterparts. It allowed Americans to reach results consistent 
with the right of expatriation without formally resolving whether expatriation 
was possible outside of a revolutionary context.158 
Thus, in The Venus,159 a case involving a challenge to a licensed American 
privateer’s confiscation of goods of naturalized American citizens who were 
living for trading purposes in Great Britain during the War of 1812,160 Justice 
Washington relied on The Vigilantia and its progeny to hold that an American 
domiciled for trading purposes in an enemy state, “while not an enemy, in the 
 
 154. The Vigilantia, 165 Eng. Rep. at 79. 
 155. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *357 (stating that a subject’s natural allegiance is “a debt of gratitude, 
which cannot be forfeited, canceled, or altered, by any change of time, place, or circumstance”). Even 
Englishmen naturalized in a foreign country were understood to retain a native allegiance to Great Britain. Id. at 
*358. 
 156. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 268 (“The claim that every man had the right to slough off his allegiance 
and to discard his citizenship was a direct extrapolation and generalization of the right of election affirmed during 
the Revolution.”); see also 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 96 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803) (“[T]he whole 
that we have seen, it appears, that the right of emigration is a right strictly natural; and that the restraints which 
may be imposed upon the exercise of it, are merely creatures of the juris positivi, or municipal laws of a state. 
And consequently that wherever the laws of any country do not prohibit, they permit emigration, or, as I rather 
chuse to call it, expatriation.”).  
 157. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 271 (“Some judges showed great reluctance to diverge too widely from the 
old English notion of perpetual allegiance . . . .”). 2 KENT, supra note 92, at 42 (noting uncertainty about the 
right of expatriation on the international plane, and concluding that “the better opinion would seem to be, that a 
citizen cannot renounce his allegiance to the United States without the permission of government, to be declared 
by law; and that, as there is no existing legislative regulation on the case, the rule of the English common law 
remains unaltered”). 
 158. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 276 (“Not surprisingly, both state and federal courts frequently preferred 
to evade adjudicating the question of expatriation instead of confronting it squarely; alternative legal doctrines 
were available that often allowed the courts to sidestep citizenship questions. Perhaps most useful was the tenet 
that residence or domicil could establish a person’s ‘national character’ for certain purposes . . . .”). 
 159. See The Venus, 12 U.S. 253 (1814). 
 160. Id. at 276. 
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strict sense of the word,” was nonetheless “stamp[ed] . . . with the national 
character of the state where he resides,” becoming “a citizen of an inferior order” 
of that state.161 The United States, accordingly, may “seize of so much of his 
property as is concerned in the trade of the enemy.”162 
Justice Washington, however, went one step further than Scott, by linking 
The Vigilantia to a passage from Vattel’s Law of Nations.163 There, Vattel 
defined “[t]he inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens” to be “foreigners, who 
are permitted to settle and stay in the country.”164 However, said Vattel, 
“The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual 
residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united to the 
society, without participating in all its advantages.”165 The Venus equated 
Vattel’s concept of “perpetual inhabitants,” who are “citizens of an inferior 
order,” with Scott’s concept of acquisition of “national character” by 
domicile.166  
This may be a misreading of Vattel. Vattel used “inhabitant” to refer to 
someone residing in the state for an indefinite period, the modern test for 
domicile.167 By contrast, by “perpetual inhabitants” or “citizens of an inferior 
order,” Vattel appeared to be thinking of beneficiaries of something akin to the 
English legal process of “denization,”168 through which aliens and their progeny 
were granted a legal right of perpetual settlement (but not full rights of state 
membership) by a royal or some other positive legal grant.169  
 
 161. Id. at 279. 
 162. Id. at 279–80. 
 163. Id. at 278 (“The doctrine of the prize Courts, as well as of the Courts of common law, in England, . . . is 
the same with what is stated by [Vattel]; except that it is less general, and confines the consequences resulting 
from this acquired character to the property of those persons engaged in the commerce of the country in which 
they reside.”). 
 164. 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 213, at 92. 
 165. Id.  
 166. The Venus, 12 U.S. at 278–79. 
 167. Thus, in a later section, he distinguishes inhabitants from sojourners, those who are temporarily in the 
territory of the state for a defined amount of time. 2 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 99, at 153 (distinguishing the 
“inhabitants” from the strangers “who pass or sojourn in a country” for the management of their affairs). 
 168. Denizens were alien domiciliaries—persons who had taken up a residence with an animus manendi 
(with an intention to remain)¾who, along with their progeny, received by an act of positive law permanent 
protection from the sovereigns’ right to remove aliens. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 36, at *362. They owed, in 
turn, a perpetual allegiance. 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDWARD COKE 170 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (characterizing the allegiance of a denizen as “ligentia acquisita” or an “acquired 
allegiance,” the same type of allegiance of naturalized subjects). Denizens were therefore often termed 
“subjects” in English law, although subjects of an inferior order to naturalized subjects. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra 
note 36, at *362.  
 169. See 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, § 213, at 92 (defining perpetual inhabitants as those “who have received 
the right of perpetual residence” (emphasis added)). Chief Justice Marshall seemed to interpret this passage in a 
similarly restrictive fashion. See The Venus, 12 U.S. at 289–91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting Vattel defined 
a “perpetual inhabitant” as someone with the intention of “staying always”; and then noting “[t]he right of the 
citizens or subjects of one country to remain in another, depends on the will of the sovereign”; thus, “[i]f the 
stranger has not the power of making his residence perpetual, . . . . an intention always to stay there ought not, I 
think, to be fixed” without evidence the domiciliary has been “specially permitted to stay” by the host sovereign). 
Gordon Sherman argued that Vattel’s concept of perpetual inhabitants had in mind the Swiss Einwohner, 
permanent legal residents granted the right of perpetual residence, who lacked full political rights. Sherman notes 
that the Einwohner were “truly . . . citizen[s] ‘in the sense of the constitution, merely lacking eligibility for public 
office,’” which was reserved to the Swiss patrician families. See Gordan E. Sherman, Emancipation and 
Citizenship, 15 YALE L.J. 263, 276 n.37 (1906). The German international law theorist Christian Wolff (a major 
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Regardless, The Venus not only suggested the prize law doctrine of 
“citizenship” was acquired by what amounts to an ordinary modern domicile—
a mere intent to reside somewhere indefinitely—but it articulated this as a 
general principle of international law, one that swept well beyond the context of 
capture during time of war.170 
In the wake of The Venus and similar cases in the first two decades in the 
early nineteenth century, American international law treatises like Joseph 
Story’s Conflict of Laws and Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, 
would characterize the doctrine of international law “citizenship” similarly.171 
And in 1853, the State Department made this the official doctrine of the United 
States in the so-called Kostza Affair, a dispute over Austria’s seizure and 
imprisonment of a refugee, Martin Koszta, domiciled in America who had not 
yet become a naturalized American citizen.  
In the process, the Secretary of State made explicit an idea that was, 
arguably, implicit in The Vigilantia. Domicile, Scott had said, “stamped” or 
“impressed” the domiciliary with the national character of his chosen home in 
the eyes of prize law.172 The metaphor of “stamping” or “impressing” a character 
suggested that the status of citizen is not acquired voluntarily, but is simply a 
label for someone who “belongs” to the state by virtue of being subject to the 
state’s unalloyed territorial power.173 
Secretary of State Marcy seized on this implication to justify American 
 
influence on Vattel), by contrast, did classify all alien visitors, even those sojourning in the country for a limited 
time, as “temporary citizens.” 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM [THE 
LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC METHOD] §§ 303–04 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) 
(1764) (“[F]oreigners, as long as they dwell in alien territory or stay there, are temporary citizens. For when they 
enter an alien territory they tacitly bind themselves that they wish to subject their acts to the laws of the place, 
and the laws have the same force over them as over citizens.”). His view was, however, was an outlier among 
eighteenth century international law writers, and we can find no evidence that it had an impact on American 
conceptions of citizenship. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, 
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 12 (1996) (alluding to the fact that Wolff’s definition of “citizen” was 
broader than other theorists).  
 170. The Venus, 12 U.S. at 278 (characterizing the British prize cases as consistent the general principle of 
international law, but noting that the British cases operate a “less general” manner confined to prize and capture 
during wartime). 
 171. For example, in his 1834 treatise Conflict of Laws, Joseph Story declared that while “[p]ersons who 
are born in a country are generally deemed to be citizens and subjects of that country,” citizens who establish a 
domicile in foreign country “acquire[]” the “national character” of that country. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES § 48, 
at 47–49 (Boston, Hillard Gray & Co. 1834) (citing The Venus, Vattel, and the admiralty decisions by Sir Walter 
Scott) (discussing the principles of “public law” of “unquestioned authority” relating to domicil in foreign 
countries). However, citing Scott’s decision in The Indian Chief, Story noted the party “reacquires” the character 
of his native domicil when “has left the country animo non revertendi and is on his return to his ‘native country’.” 
Id. The American Henry Wheaton’s Elements of International Law, published in 1836, also described these same 
rules as a general principle of international law. 4 HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 319, 
at 42 (London, B. Fellowes, Ludgate St. 1832) (“Whatever may be the extent of claims of a man’s native country 
upon his political allegiance, there can be no doubt that the natural-born subject of one country may become the 
citizen of another, in time of peace, for the purposes of trade” through establishing an “acquired domicil” there). 
 172. The Vigilantia (1798) 165 Eng. Rep. 74, 79 (Adm.). 
 173. Koessler, supra note 92, at 62–63 (discussing this concept and noting modern usage calls it 
“nationality,” while alluding to earlier use of the term “citizen” to convey the same idea); Dudley O. McGovney, 
American Citizenship, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 235–36, 258–59 (1911) (similarly defining “nationality” as the 
status of “belonging” to a state, and noting that in its broadest sense it embraces persons who have a simple 
domicile in a state, while arguing the term should be understood in a narrower sense). 
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assertion of authority of Kostza, a non-citizen. International law, wrote Secretary 
Marcy, “has clear and distinct rules of its own,” independent of “municipal 
codes.”174 “Foreigners may, and often do, acquire a domicil in a country, even 
though they have entered it with the avowed intention not to become naturalized 
citizens[;] . . . and, wherever they acquire a domicil, international law at once 
impresses upon them the national character of the country of that 
domicil. . . . [I]t forces it upon him often very much against his will . . . .”175 This 
impressed “national character” Marcy called “nationality,” and he argued it 
enjoins other countries to respect the American domiciliary “as an American 
citizen.”176 Contemporaneous (and later) commentators noted the Secretary of 
State’s debt to the turn-of-the-century prize cases.177 
Then, just a few years later, in 1858, the abolitionist lawyer John Codman 
Hurd, in his magisterial treatise The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United 
States would explicitly connect Article III citizenship to “international law,” 
while articulating that law in ways reminiscent of the State Department in the 
Koszta Affair: In Article III, he would argue, “persons are . . . called citizens in 
reference to that element in the definition of citizen which ordinarily determines 
questions of personal jurisdiction in the application of international private law, 
and . . . has no reference to the civil or political liberty, (privileges and 
immunities of legal persons,) but simply to their quality of being legal persons, 
domiciled in this or that forum of jurisdiction.”178 
 2.  The Distinct Role of Domicile in the Framing Era Law of Citizenship 
This concept of state “citizenship”—as a “legal person” subject to the 
general “personal jurisdiction” of a state179—is essentially the concept of Article 
III citizenship articulated, in so many words, in the modern law of federal 
 
 174. Mr. Marcy to Mr. Hulsemann (Sept. 26, 1853), in CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF 
STATE AND THE CHARGE D’AFFAIRES OF AUSTRIA RELATIVE TO THE CASE OF MARTIN KOSZTA 18 (U.S. Dep’t 
of State trans., 1853). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. (emphasis added).  
 177. Id. In 1858, English international law scholar John Westlake would criticize the Secretary of State for 
over-generalizing from Scott’s capture cases. Westlake argued instead these cases should be confined to the 
narrow context of property rights in a declared war. JOHN WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, OR THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 49–50 (London, W. Maxwell 1858) (noting in the course of discussing the 
Hulsemann Letter that while it “may require that the protection enjoyed in time of war by property . . . shall be 
founded on domicile,” it is “scarcely” the case that “one whose avowed intention it was not to be naturalized 
should . . . be treated as naturalized when beyond the territory” in other contexts); see also McGovney, supra 
note 173, at 249 (“So far as Secretary Marcy based Kostza’s alleged ‘national character’ upon his domicil in the 
United States he was applying rules applicable to the entirely different matter of the quasi-nationality recognized 
in prize law . . . .”). 
 178. 1 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES § 372, at 436 
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1858). It would take a century for writers to distinguish the two concepts of 
citizenship, by reserving the word “national” (the term alternatively suggested by Secretary Marcy) for the status 
of “belonging to a state” in the eyes of international law, while reserving the term “citizen” for a person entitled 
to municipal rights and privileges under domestic law. See Koessler, supra note 92, at 62–63 (“‘Citizenship,’ in 
modern usage, is not a synonym of nationality or a term generally used for the status of belonging to a state”; 
“the trend is to reserve the term ‘national’ for the designation of that status by virtue of which a person, 
internationally, belongs to a certain state, and to speak of ‘citizenship’ when the local status referred to is one of 
domestic rather than international law”).  
 179. HURD, supra note 178, at 436. 
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jurisdiction that gradually emerged in the twentieth century. It can, obviously, 
embrace modern corporations as well as natural persons. Corporations, qua 
corporations, don’t have sentiments or emotional attachments, but modern 
corporations can form the type of territorial connections that subject them to a 
state’s general “jurisdiction.”180  
As a result, if “citizen” is simply a term for persons conceptualized as 
having territorial ties that subject them to a state’s general “jurisdiction,” it is a 
concept that can extend—as Hurd implied—to any “legal person,” including the 
modern corporation.  
Yet, this use of “citizen”¾as a term for “belonging” to a state in the eyes 
of international law through simple subjection to a state’s general jurisdiction 
through a “domicile”¾is simply not on display in popular American discourse 
prior to 1800.  
Typically, Americans used “inhabitant” to mean anyone domiciled in a 
state, a sense that embraced both “citizens” and aliens who had not been 
naturalized, including but not limited to formal “denizens” (a status whose 
conferral an order-in-council “effectively halted” in the colonies after 1700, but 
was revived by some states post-independence).181 Thus, said Delaware’s High 
Court of Errors and Appeals in 1819, the term inhabitant “comprehends the 
inhabitants generally, citizen and alien.”182  
In Federalist 42, in the course of critiquing Article IV of the Articles of 
Confederation (its “Comity Clause”), James Madison noted this was the more 
common sense of “inhabitant.”183 The Articles’ “Comity Clause,” granted the 
“privileges and immunities of free citizens of the several states” to the “free 
inhabitants of each of these states.”184 And, complained Madison, “it seems to 
be a construction scarcely avoidable . . . that those who come under the 
denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not citizens of such 
State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS 
of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their 
own State.”185 That construction was “scarcely avoidable” because “inhabitants” 
ordinarily meant a simple “domiciliary,” a term that could embrace not only 
 
 180. The concept of corporations as “subject” to a state’s power is, indeed, hardly modern. Although 
corporations were not called “subjects” in ordinary discourse, see supra notes 135–144, Thomas Hobbes 
characterized them as such in De Cive, because they, along with “citizens,” are “subject of him who hath the 
chief command.” HOBBES, supra note 92, ch. 5, §§ 10–11, at 170–71 (“companies of merchants,” “convents,” 
and other corporate entities, which Hobbes calls “civil persons subordinate to the city,” are formed by the 
“citizens” of the “city”; and they are called, along with the “citizens” who compose them, “the subject of him 
who hath the chief command”). 
 181. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 95; Alexander Hamilton, Motion on Citizenship Requirement for 
Membership in the House of Representatives (August 13, 1787), in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
1787-1788, at 234, 234 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962) (moving that the “section be so altered as to require merely 
citizenship and inhabitancy”). 
 182. Douglass’ Adm’r v. Stevens, 2 Del. Cas. 489, 500 (1819). The distinction continued well into the 
antebellum period. See Quinby v. Duncan, 4 Del. 383, 384 (Super. Ct. 1846) (“A man may be a citizen, without 
being an inhabitant, of the State; as a man may be an inhabitant, without being a citizen. This is an obvious 
distinction . . . .”). 
 183. THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 277–78 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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citizens, but also non-citizens. 
However, Madison also noted that “inhabitant” also might mean “citizen 
alone”—meaning either a native or an alien who had been “naturaliz[ed].”186 
And he noted if “such an exposition of the term ‘inhabitants’ were admitted” it 
would solve many problems with the Comity Clause of the Articles of 
Confederation. (And for precisely this reason, Madison explained, the 
Constitution of 1787 adopted the substance of the Comity Clause, while 
substituting “citizen” for “inhabitant.”) 
The use of “inhabitants” to mean “citizens” was, as Madison suggested, 
unusual—but it was far from unknown in ordinary discourse in the 1780s. 
Americans sometimes treated “inhabitant “and “citizen” as interchangeable—
but they did so because domicile was one of the common prerequisites for state 
“member”- or “citizen”-ship in the Articles period. 
The reason for this linkage lay in the pre-ratification link between 
citizenship and social ties or attachments unpacked earlier. To be a citizen was, 
at a minimum, to be someone who was a proper object of an expectation of 
affective attachment to a state. Domicile, in turn, was commonly considered one 
relation between person and state that justified that expectation. 
This view of the link between domicile and citizenship spanned both 
revolutionary movements at the end of the eighteenth century, the American and 
the French.  
The French, in the Constitution of 1791, distinguished between passive and 
active citizens. Passive citizens enjoyed equal civil rights, but could not vote or 
hold office, while active citizens also held the elective franchise. As Charlotte 
Wells writes, qualifying for the entry-level tier of “passive citizenship” in turn 
required “the individual’s choice to be French as indicated by residence on 
French soil,” a choice that signaled “loyalty to a community espousing 
democratic and egalitarian ideals.”187 
The idea that domicile indicated voluntary attachment to a state was 
equally current in America. For example, Jefferson, writing in 1776 to Edmund 
Pendleton, noted that he was “for extending the right of suffrage (or in other 
words the rights of a citizen) to all who had a permanent intention of living in 
the country.”188 “Take what circumstances you please as evidence of this,” 
explained Jefferson, “either the having resided a certain time, or having a family, 
 
 186. Id. 
 187. WELLS, supra note 51, at 142. As Wells notes, the idea that domicile was essential to forming an 
attachment to a community had deep roots in Western legal thought. See id. at 33 (discussing the influence, in 
early modern France, of the fifteenth century view that “a change in domicile . . . could eventually alter the 
inborn habitus of ancestral citizenship”).  
 188. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton, Philadelphia, Aug. 26, 1776, YALE L. SCH. 
LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY: THE AVALON PROJECT, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/let9.asp (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2020). Even those who argued for relaxing domicile or residence periods as test for citizenship 
conceded that affective attachment was a criterion for citizenship. Instead, radicals of the period, like the Paine-
ite Joel Barlow, contended that residency periods, or even domicile, were no longer necessary to secure 
emigrants’ attachment to republican communities, because the spread of republican liberty would lead the 
“citizens of one state [to] consider those of any other state as their brothers,” and so “a mere declaration of their 
intention of residence will be sufficient to entitle them to all the rights that the natives possess.” See BARLOW, 
supra note 106, at 36.  
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or having property, any or all of them. Whoever intends to live in a country must 
wish that country well, [and] has a natural right of assisting in the preservation 
of it.”189  
Consistent with the view that an intention of living in the state indicated 
attachment to it, most American states, in addition to an oath of allegiance, either 
required an intention to “settle,” “remain,” or establish a domicile in the state;190 
or satisfaction of “a specific period of residence”191 as a prerequisite to become 
a naturalized “citizen”192 during the Articles of Confederation period.193 As 
 
 189. Letter from Jefferson, supra note 188. 
 190. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 214–18; see also An Act for Preventing Improper or Disafected Persons, 
supra note 117, at 162–66 (specifying that applicants for naturalization must have an “intent to remain” within 
the state and demonstrate their “Attachment to the Liberties and Independence of the United States of America”); 
N.J. HIST. RECS. PROGRAM, GUIDE TO NATURALIZATION RECORDS IN NEW JERSEY 3 (1941) (“[A]ll Inhabitants 
of this Colony of full age who are worth fifty pounds, Proclamation money, clear Estate in the same, and have 
resided within the county in which they claim a vote for 12 months immediately preceding the election, shall be 
entitled to vote for representatives in council and assembly, and also for all other public officers that shall be 
elected by the people of the county at large.” (quoting Act of July 2, 1776)); PA. CONST. of 1776 § 42, in 5 THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, 
TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3081, 3091 (Francis Newton Thorpe, ed., 1909) (“Every foreigner of good 
character who comes to settle in this state, having first taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, 
may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year’s 
residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a natural born subject of this 
state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative until after two years residence.”); N.C. 
CONST. of 1776, art. XL, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, at 2787, 2793–94 (“[E]very 
foreigner, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath of allegiance to the same, may purchase, 
or, by other means, acquire, hold, and transfer land, or other real estate; and after one year’s residence, shall be 
deemed a free citizen.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLII, in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra, 
at 2623, 2637–38 (“[I]t shall be in the discretion of the legislature to naturalize all such persons, and in such 
manner, as they shall think proper: Provided, All such of the persons so to be by them naturalized, as being born 
in parts beyond sea, and out of the United States of America, shall come to settle in and become subjects of this 
State, shall take an oath of allegiance to this State, and abjure and renounce all allegiance and subjection to all 
and every foreign king, prince, potentate, and State in all matters, ecclesiastical as well as civil.”); VT. CONST. 
of 1777, art. XLIII, § XXXVIII, in 6 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND 
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 3737, 3747–48 (Francis Newton Thorpe, 
ed., 1909) (“Every foreigner of good character, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an oath or 
affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other just means acquire, hold, and transfer, land or 
other real estate; and after one years residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and intitled to all the 
rights of a natural born subject of this State; except that he shall not be capable of being elected a representative, 
until after two years residence.”). 
 191. See Thomas Johnson, An Act for Naturalization, in 1 THE LAWS OF MARYLAND 362, 362–64 (Virgil 
Maxcy, ed., 1811) (declaring the intention of the act of naturalization is to encourage foreigners to “settle” in 
the state, but requiring only a declaration of “belief in the Christian religion” and an oath that the application 
will be “faithful and bear true allegiance to the state” to naturalize foreigners, while also requiring residence for 
a specified period of years to hold public office); An Act Declaring Who Shall Be Deemed Citizens of this 
Commonwealth, in 10 THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 129, 
129–130 (William Waller Hening, ed., 1822) (providing “[t]hat all white persons born within the territory of this 
commonwealth, and all who have resided therein two years next before the passing of this act; and all who shall 
hereafter migrate into the same, other than alien enemies, and shall before any court of record, given satisfactory 
proof by their own oath or affirmation that they intend to reside therein; and moreover shall give assurance of 
fidelity to the commonwealth” are citizens). 
 192. Some states, like Pennsylvania, Vermont, and New York, used the traditional term subject, rather than 
“citizen,” which became the preferred term for state membership only in the latter half of the 1780s. See 
Koessler, supra note 92, at 58–59. In oral argument in Respublica v. Chapman, decided in 1781, the attorney 
general of Pennsylvania interpreted the appellation to be synonymous with “citizen,” and Justice McKean treated 
citizens and subjects as interchangeable terms. See Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. 53, 56 (1781) (comparing 
Pennsylvania’s provisions to provisions relating to citizenship in other states). Authorities in other states treated 
their reference to “subjects” similarly. Koessler, supra note 92, at 58–59. 
 193. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 218. 
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Kettner explains, 
The assumption underlying residence requirements was that the exercise of 
political rights required a clear and conscious attachment to and familiarity 
with republican principles. . . . [T]ime alone could insure that those imbued 
with “foreign principles” had the opportunity to assimilate the habits, values, 
and modes of thought necessary for responsible participation in a virtuous, 
self-governing republican community.194  
In most states, a continued inhabitance in the state after the Declaration of 
Independence was also a requirement for citizenship of adult natives.195 The 
reason lay with the common law rule in Calvin’s Case, which equated nativity 
with subjection only to the sovereign under whose protection one was born.196 
Thus, an adult born in the colony prior to the Revolution was not, by virtue of 
that birth, a citizen in the newly independent states, since their sovereign 
political authority did not exist at the time of his birth. In a revolutionary setting, 
some new act demonstrating volitional “allegiance” or “attachment” to a newly 
constituted body politic was therefore needed to naturalize adult natives of the 
colonies.197 States settled on continued “residence” or “inhabitance” (or 
maintaining a “domicile” in the state) as that act.198 And so, as the Supreme 
Court would comment years later, “after the colonies had become the United 
States, . . . their inhabitants [were] generally citizens of those States.”199  
That led many Americans to use “inhabitant” and “citizen” 
interchangeably. For example, in 1782 New York enacted a statute staying suits 
for debts “by, or from any person nor within the enemies power or lines that has 
remained with, gone into, or has in consequence of any of law this State been 
sent within the enemies power.”200 The statute’s preamble characterized the 
 
 194. Id. at 218–19. 
 195. Id. at 183–84 (“[I]n the eyes of ‘patriot’ authorities, the circumstances of [loyalists’] birth, residence, 
or behavior sufficed in law to prove them citizens of the new states. Their continued residence under the new 
republican governments after independence evinced their choice of allegiance, and adherence to Great Britain 
thereafter proved them not loyal subjects but disloyal citizens.”); Hamilton, supra note 106, at 533 (“By the 
declaration of Independence on the 4th of July, in the year 1776, acceded to by our Convention on the ninth, the 
late colony of New-York became an independent state. All the inhabitants, who were subjects under the former 
government, and who did not withdraw themselves upon the change which took place, were to be considered as 
citizens, owing allegiance to the new government. This, at least, is the legal presumption; and this was the 
principle, in fact, upon which all the measures of our public councils have been grounded.”). 
 196. See, e.g., Dawson’s Lessee v. Godfrey, 8 U.S. 321, 322–23 (1807) (holding that those who were born 
under the allegiance of Great Britain and who never changed allegiance to the new American government are 
aliens); see also Bernadette Meyler, The Gestation of Birthright Citizenship, 1868-1898 States’ Rights, the Law 
of Nations, and Mutual Consent, 15 GEO. IMMMIGR. L.J. 519, 527–29 (2001) (discussing reliance on Calvin’s 
Case in post-revolutionary litigation concerning the inheritance rights of those born before the revolution).  
 197. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 183–84. The insistence on an act of volitional allegiance may also have 
reflected the Lockean view, current among some of the framing generation, that citizenship required a voluntary 
choice of affiliation. Consistent with this view, some in the 1780s believed that “birth” could not confer full 
citizenship—one had to continue to affiliate with the state upon one’s majority to become an actual “citizen.” 
See SMITH, supra note 46, at 130 (noting Locke’s view that “children were not members of any political 
community”). 
 198. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 183–84, 193–98. 
 199. Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. 99, 122 (1830). 
 200. An Act Relative to Debts Due to Persons Within Enemies Lines (July 12, 1782), in LAWS OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK, PASSED AT POUGHKEEPSIE, IN THE FIRST MEETING OF THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE 
499, 499 (1782). 
214 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 72:169 
persons who remained or had gone into enemy lines as “inhabitants” of the 
state.201  
After the Revolutionary War, some New Yorkers argued the act affected 
enforcement actions by British creditors who had remained or gone into enemy 
territory. Alexander Hamilton, however, argued the term “inhabitants” referred, 
in context, to New York citizens who were “within the enemy’s power or lines.” 
It did not apply to “British subjects” in British-controlled territory.202 The text 
of the statute itself supported his argument, because the statute referred, later in 
act, to the New York inhabitants at issue as state “citizens.”203 The statute thus 
stayed actions for debts by New Yorkers whose attachment or loyalty to New 
York was in question because they had taken up a domicile in enemy territory 
but did not reach ordinary British subjects.204 Other examples of similar usage 
recur during revolutionary and post-revolutionary period.205 
The upshot was that in 1787 citizenship and domicile were associated 
terms. But citizenship in 1787 remained a concept that communicated an 
expectation of attachment or social ties. Domicile, in turn, mattered to 
citizenship as a legal matter because it was a common legal proxy for affective 
attachment to a community on which the status of citizen was predicated.  
It’s likely that the link between domicile and social attachment also played 
a role, at least initially, in the nineteenth-century prize cases themselves. The 
link between domicile and affective attachment, after all, extended well into the 
late antebellum period. Even as late as 1858, the influential English international 
law scholar John Westlake would characterize the test for changing a legal 
domicile in “international private law” (the term, at the time, for the principles 
of conflict of laws) as a test for assessing whether one has “transfer[red] the 
sentiments of home” by forming “attachments” to a new locality.206  
As a result, at the turn of the nineteenth century, domicile in a foreign state 
may have suggested the American abroad had formed enough of an actual, 
functional attachment to a foreign territory to justify confiscation of an 
American citizen’s property as the property of an “enemy,” although not enough 
 
 201. Id. (“Whereas many of the inhabitants of this State who have not remained within the enemies [sic] 
power, and who were indebted to others who did so remain . . . .”). 
 202. Alexander Hamilton, Philo Camillus No. 3 (August 12, 1795), in 19 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON, 1795-1795, at 124, 134 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1973) (“It was natural too to understand the word 
inhabitants as equivalent to citizens” and in contradistinction to “British subjects”). Hamilton also noted that this 
was a narrow construction of the term, implying the usual sense of inhabitant was broader than citizen. 
 203. An Act Relative to Debts Due to Persons, supra note 200, at 499 (referring to the “relief of such Citizens 
of this State”). 
 204. Hamilton, supra note 106, at 533 (“By the declaration of Independence on the 4th of July, in the year 
1776, acceded to by our Convention on the ninth, the late colony of New-York became an independent state. All 
the inhabitants, who were subjects under the former government, and who did not withdraw themselves upon 
the change which took place, were to be considered as citizens, owing allegiance to the new government. This, 
at least, is the legal presumption; and this was the principle, in fact, upon which all the measures of our public 
councils have been grounded.”). 
 205. See 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 104, at 397 (May 29, 1777) (letter 
addressed to the “Inhabitants of the United States of America,” with the salutation “Friends and Fellow-
Citizens”); 22 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, at 341 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1914) (June 21, 1782) 
(referring interchangeably to “citizens” and “inhabitants” of the United States). 
 206. WESTLAKE, supra note 177, at 41.  
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to justify a criminal prosecution.207 (This was exactly the same result—
vulnerability to confiscation in times of war, but no criminal jeopardy¾that 
would obtain if America, at the time, had recognized a formal right of 
expatriation).208 
The result was that, in early nineteenth-century international law, the word 
“citizen” was drafted to convey a presumption of a functional attachment to a 
foreign political community through a change in domicile, serving as a make-
shift bridge to Congress’s eventual recognition of a formal right of expatriation 
in American law after the Civil War.209  
On a parallel track (and perhaps influenced both by the typical pre-
ratification requirements for state citizenship as well as evolving international 
law standards), the concept of citizenship through domicile helped select a 
unique state to which each American was attached, in a way that made coherent 
sense of the Constitution’s language and structure. The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause prospectively qualified each native or naturalized citizen of 
the United States for the enjoyment of rights of citizenship in every state210—
but it would take an act of purposeful attachment to a given state, indicated by a 
choice of domicile, to make one a “citizen” of a particular state within the 
meaning of Article III.211  
In either case, these new uses of the term preserved continuity with a legal 
and popular view, in the decade after the revolution, that “citizenship” 
communicated an expectation that one had formed a voluntary “attachment” or 
the “sentiments of home” in relation to a particular political community.  
IV.  CORPORATIONS AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CITIZENSHIP 
CLAUSE 
The end of the eighteenth century isn’t the only period with which 
originalists must be concerned. In 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment added what 
the original constitution lacked—a general definition of national and state 
citizenship.  
Because each term in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause 
 
 207. This conception of the role of domicile seemed to animate Justice Marshall’s dissent (his longest) in 
The Venus. See The Venus, 12 U.S. 253, 291–92 (1814) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The stranger merely residing 
in a country during peace, however long his stay, and whatever his employment, provided it be such as strangers 
may engage in, cannot, on the principles of national law, be considered as incorporated into that society, so as, 
immediately on a declaration of war, to become the enemy of his own.”).  
 208. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 277–78. 
 209. Expatriation Act of 1868, 15 Stat. 223 (1868) (current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1841). 
 210. Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276, 1276 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (noting that the privileges-and-immunities 
clause makes the citizens of each state to a degree “citizens of the several states,” but noting the judiciary article 
nonetheless makes “a distinction between them, in their right to sue in Courts of the union,” since, otherwise, 
citizens of the states could never qualify for diversity jurisdiction). 
 211. Chief Justice Marshall, who articulated the basic criteria for Article III citizenship in Prentiss v. Barton, 
seemed to allude to this view of the domicile requirement for Article III citizenship. He described establishing a 
domicile in the state as being “incorporated into the body of the state.” Prentiss, 19 F. Cas. at 1276–77. But see 
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 631 (Boston, Hillard, Gray, & 
Co. 1833) (suggesting that a change in inhabitance changes state citizenship through the operation of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause, rather than through a change in allegiance). 
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employs operative sortal terms—“born” and “naturalized”¾applicable only to 
real human beings, the Citizenship Clause, while settling profound questions 
about who is part of the American political community, didn’t expand the term 
beyond its original natural person boundary. Rather, it ratified a continuing 
popular association of citizens with natural persons. 
Below we review the evidence. 
 
 
A.  “BORN” AND “NATURALIZED”: THE OPERATIVE TERMS OF THE CITIZENSHIP 
CLAUSE 
Under the unique demands of the immediate post-revolutionary period, 
Americans, we showed above,212 employed the solidaristic concept of volitional 
allegiance as the principal mechanism for sorting between American “citizens” 
and “non-citizens.” After the revolution, citizens were those who formed a 
solidaristic attachment to the new republic by tacitly or expressly pledging their 
faith to the newly independent American states. 
In the common law formula for subjecthood, though, subjects were either 
“born” or “naturalized.” Those born under the protection of a new political 
community presumptively had a natural attachment—“faith and love”¾toward 
the community of their birth, making them “natural” subjects.213 Those who 
acquired an attachment not native to them through continued residence could be 
rewarded with subjecthood via naturalization.  
While these common law criteria appeared inconsistently in linguistic 
evidence for the meaning of citizen in the lead up to 1787, the Constitution, by 
making “natural born citizenship” of the United States a qualification for the 
Presidency while giving Congress the power of “naturalization,” seemed to 
ratify both parts of the common law formula.214  
And after 1787, “birth in the allegiance” of the United States and 
naturalization became popularly understood as the two paths to American 
“citizenship.”215 Yet, for those Americans bent on excluding free blacks from 
equal rights, awarding citizenship based on native birth would not do. 
Accordingly, in the early decades of the nineteenth century, pro-slavery forces 
supplemented the common law criteria for citizenship in order to exclude 
African Americans from the equality that American citizenship promised. That 
 
 212. See supra notes 190–199 and accompanying text. 
 213. See 1 BACON, supra note 73, at 76 (“[E]very man is presumed to bear Faith and Love to that Prince 
and Country where he first received Protection during his Infancy . . . .”); 1 VATTEL, supra note 99, §119 at 52 
(“[L]ove of our country is natural to all men. The good and wife author of nature has taken care to bind them, 
by a kind of instinct, to the places where they received their first breath, and they love their own nation, as a 
thing with which they are intimately connected.”). 
 214. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 215. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287 (noting that after ratification, “[n]o one appeared to reexamine and 
justify Coke’s idea of the ‘natural born citizen.’ Americans merely continued to assume ‘birth within the 
allegiance’ conferred the status and its accompanying rights”); Meyler, supra note 196, at 528–30 (surveying 
American courts’ reliance on Coke’s opinion before and after the revolution). 
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effort reached its awful nadir in Dred Scott v. Sandford,216 which posited 
additional race-based identity criteria that limited “natural born citizenship” to 
whites.217  
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause undid Dred Scott, by 
specifying that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the 
State where they reside.”218 This is a general definitional clause that collectively 
clarifies all of the Constitution’s citizenship provisions using the operative terms 
“born” and “naturalized.”  
And, precisely because the common law “assumptions about the origins, 
character, and effects of citizenship were so pervasive” during antebellum 
debates about immigration and racial equality, birth and naturalization had, in 
the context of antebellum citizenship-talk, a well-understood meaning, which 
we turn to explore in the next Subparts.219  
B.  “BORN” CITIZENS WERE NATURAL PERSONS 
Birth, of course, has a literal and a figurative sense. But as Webster’s 
Dictionary (1828) noted, birth was generally used to mean “[t]he act of coming 
into life, or of being born” and “[e]xcept in poetry, it is generally applied to 
human beings; as the birth of a son.”220  
The literal meaning of birth played a constitutive role in the common law 
test for subjecthood. Those “born” into subjecthood were literally born, thanks 
to the simple syllogism at the heart of Calvin’s Case: Born subjects had a duty 
of allegiance. The ascription of a duty of allegiance was declarative.221 It 
reflected in the law the internal state of mind of born subjects, because “God” 
had placed the natural sentiment of allegiance in the “soul” of men born under 
the king’s protection.222 To have a soul, is to be embodied—to be a real, not a 
legally constructed, person.223 And so, the formula that linked birth to allegiance 
identified the possessor of natural allegiance as someone who had experienced 
a natural birth—a natural person, not a legal construct.224 
Following the common law tradition, the popular debates over the relation 
 
 216. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 405–27 (1857). 
 217. Taney’s opinion also excluded native born African Americans from the scope of the Naturalization 
Clause, thereby relegating them, absent a constitutional amendment, to a perpetually inferior caste status. See 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 49, at 356–57.  
 218. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 219. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287–88. 
 220. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 23 (New York, S. 
Converse 1828) (defining “birth”); see also id. at 198 (defining “born”). 
 221. ANONYMOUS, supra note 70, at 208 (natural allegiance is “intrinsic and primitive”). 
 222. Calvin’s Case (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 385 (K.B.) (“[L]igeance, and faith and trust which are her 
members and parts, are qualities of the mind and soul of man . . . .”); id. at 392 (the duty of allegiance “is written 
with the finger of God in the heart of man”).  
 223. See Case of Sutton’s Hospital (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B.). 
 224. The same implication, of course, followed from the decision’s affective conception of allegiance. As 
Ellesmere put it in his summary of the case, allegiance is a human sentiment and therefore is only ever given by 
a “natural body” to a “natural body.” EGERTON, supra note 88, at 101. Since natural bodies—real people born 
to real parents¾are the only ones who exhibit the allegiance that makes a “subject,” “natural born” subjects are, 
a fortiori, also persons who are literally “born.” 
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of birth to American citizenship in the 1840s and 1850s over immigration and 
abolition would also associate “born” citizenship exclusively with literal 
birth.225  
To take one example: in 1845, at the start of the influx of refugees from 
Ireland’s great potato famine, Massachusetts congressman Robert Winthrop 
introduced a resolution urging Congress to consider “an immediate and thorough 
revision” to the federal naturalization statutes in order to protect the “purity of 
the ballot box.”226 Rep. Lewis Levin then urged Congress to increase the 
statutory residency period for naturalization (to an astounding twenty-one years) 
and consider other reforms targeted at reducing the “influence of foreigners.”227 
The advocates of naturalization reform, in turn, sounded nativist themes that 
would become central to the xenophobic Know Nothing movement that raged 
over the next decade.  
Their arguments emphasized the “fact of alien birth . . . in connection with 
the known feelings of the human heart toward the spot of native home,”228 in a 
way that showcased the dark side of affective republicanism:229 The “foreign 
born,” nativists argued, are raised in a foreign culture without familiarity for 
republican values or institutions.230 As a result, the “naturalized” citizen lacks 
“affection” and “attachment” for America that characterizes a true “citizen”.231 
(The argument was a euphemistic cover for religious bigotry against 
Catholics).232  
The anti-nativists233 countered that “our whole experience teaches us 
 
 225. 1 BOUVIER, supra note 36, at 72 (defining “birth,” for purposes of assigning legal statuses, as not only 
having a “mother” but also being “brought wholly into the world independent of one’s mother”—for example, 
viability outside the mother’s womb). 
 226. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1845) (opening debate on Massachusetts resolution); CONG. 
GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1845) (introduction of Massachusetts resolution by Winthrop).  
 227. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (speech of Rep. Levin). Rep. Lucien 
Chase suggested that Rep. Winthrop and that “delegation from his State coincided in opinion with the Native 
Americans.” CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 67 (1845).  
 228. See CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 63–64 (1845) (Rep. Sims) (characterizing the 
position of the nativists).  
 229. See Shklar, supra note 79, at 195 (“The approval of group-based loyalty and arguments for and against 
political obligation based on such loyalty tends, however, to mute, indeed to forget, that exclusion is an 
unavoidable and essential feature of such loyalty.”); Jacob T. Levy, Against Fraternity: Democracy Without 
Solidarity, in THE STRAINS OF COMMITMENT: THE POLITICAL SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 
107, 119 (Keith Banting & Will Kymlicka eds., 2017) (noting the “persistent” theme of “solidaristic unity” in 
the American and French republican traditions and arguing we would be better off discarding this part of that 
tradition); Linda Bosniak, Constitutional Citizenship Through the Prism of Alienage, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1285, 
1316–24 (2002) (noting the exclusionary implications of the tradition of associating equal citizenship with 
national solidarity). 
 230. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (Rep. Levin). 
 231. Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger) (characterizing 
nativists as questioning the “attachment” of emigrants to American principles); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st 
Sess. Appendix 44–45 (1845) (Rep. Bowlin) (characterizing nativists as questioning the “affection” of emigrants 
for the American project); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong. 1st Sess. Appendix 67–68 (1845) (Rep. Chase) (agreeing 
with opponents that the “existence of our government depends on the attachment of its citizens,” but arguing 
that “for a zealous attachment” to American institutions, the foreign born are “unsurpassed”). 
 232. ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE 
THE CIVIL WAR 226–60 (2d ed. 1995). 
 233. In the debates in the mid-1840s cited above, many of the advocates of immigration were southern 
Democrats and their pro-“equality” and anti-“oppression” rhetoric was by turns explicitly and implicitly 
racialized—it extended equality and inclusion only to white immigrants. For more on the complicated ways that 
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that . . . [naturalized citizens] are equally, as much attached to [American 
institutions], if not more so.”234 The native-born citizen, explained 
Representatives Lucien Chase, Henry Bedinger, and James Bowlin, often lacks 
the “appreciation for the equality of rights” of the original revolutionary 
generation, which risked their lives on “the tented field.”235 By contrast, the very 
fact of foreign birth made emigrants more patriotic than the home born—
because of their birth in a foreign land, they have a “fresh” and “living and 
breathing” experience of the “pain” of “oppressive” foreign government.236 And 
so, while the “ties of kindred and blood will often call [an emigrant’s] memories 
back” to the “land of his birth,” “the same memory . . . will “fire his heart with 
indignation against the system of oppression which drove him away” while 
fueling “appreciation” or “gratitude” for the American “practice of justice.” 237 
In this and other debates, nativists and immigration advocates agreed that 
the birth that mattered to citizenship was literal, not figurative. To be “born” in 
a way that mattered to citizenship was also to develop attachments based on 
lived social experience—that is, to live a life. For nativists, birth in the United 
States meant one had been “presumably educated from infancy in the values and 
habits . . . [of] self-government,” and therefore presumptively attached to 
republican society.238 For immigration advocates, to be foreign born or a 
“naturalized” emigrant meant you had presumably suffered oppression and love 
justice, tangible human sentiments born of lived experience that were an even 
stronger qualification for citizenship. 239 All agreed that the labels citizen and 
alien applied to persons who were literally born somewhere. 
The normative importance of literal “birth” to citizenship-talk would also 
figure prominently in the abolitionist movement. One challenge for abolitionists 
was persuading moderates alienated by attacks, like William Lloyd Garrison’s, 
on the legitimacy of the antebellum Constitution. In response, abolitionist legal 
theorists developed arguments that abolition was, in fact, constitutionally 
required.  
These arguments were developed across the works of William Yates,240 
 
debates over immigration, racism, and slavery intersected in the antebellum period, see FONER, supra note 232, 
at 226–60. 
 234. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger). 
 235. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 68 (1845) (Rep. Chase). 
 236. Id. 
 237. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 88 (1845) (Rep. Bedinger); see also CONG. GLOBE, 
29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 44–45 (1845) (Rep. Bowlin); CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 64 
(1845) (Rep. Sims) (arguing it is the American “practice of justice” that kindles the “feeling” of patriotic 
attachment to the country). 
 238. KETTNER, supra note 46, at 287 (characterizing the traditional understanding of the link between birth 
and allegiance); see CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 46–50 (1845) (Rep. Levin) (arguing for 
extension of residency requirements for naturalization based on claims the foreign-born lack the attachment of 
the “natives” or “native-born”). 
 239. CONG. GLOBE, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix 67–68 (1845) (Rep. Chase) (agreeing that the “existence 
of our government depends on the attachment of our citizens,” but arguing that “for a zealous attachment” to 
American institutions, the foreign born are “unsurpassed”). 
 240. See WILLIAM YATES, THE RIGHTS OF COLORED MEN TO SUFFRAGE, CITIZENSHIP AND TRIAL BY JURY 
(Philadelphia, Merrihew & Gunn 1838). 
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Lysander Spooner,241 and Joel Tiffany.242 “Citizen,” Yates argued, is a category 
that vests recipients with equal rights. And, Yates noted, “the foundation of 
[citizenship is] allegiance.”243 The foundation of natural allegiance, however, 
was not race. It was, simply, “birth” within “the jurisdiction of” the United 
States. And thus, under the common law, “all who are born within the 
jurisdiction of the State,” including free blacks, owe natural “allegiance” to the 
United States, making them “full citizens.”244 Lysander Spooner and Joel 
Tiffany would go on to link the argument to the original public meaning of 
“citizen” in the text of the Constitution, and push the argument to its logical 
conclusion: native born slaves, too, were “citizens,” making them free men who 
had been unlawfully enslaved by the southern states.245  
As Martha Jones extensively recounts, the argument for birthright 
citizenship became a rallying cry for free black civil rights activists in the 1830s, 
1840s, and 1850s.246 “If we are asked what evidence we bring to sustain our 
qualifications for citizenship, we will offer them certificates of our BIRTH and 
NATIVITY,” declared activists in Pennsylvania. “[T]he vote was ‘OUR 
RIGHT,’” said a delegation of Connecticut free blacks, “as native born MEN, 
Citizens of the great Republic.”247 
These legal claims were morally potent precisely because being “born” into 
equal citizenship was not figurative. When we refer to “natural born citizens,” 
Lincoln’s Attorney General Edward Bates would write in his widely published 
1862 opinion arguing in favor of the citizenship of free blacks, we mean those 
who are “not made by law or otherwise, but born” into a state of equality. Like 
the rest of us, free blacks, he wrote, “became citizens in the natural way, by 
birth.”248  
The argument’s force lay precisely in the fact that the legal status of natural 
“born” citizen did not belong to fictive “persons.” It was legal and moral status 
that, because it belongs to human beings who are “born” in a state of legal and 
moral equality, refuted the dehumanizing premises of chattel slavery. Extending 
 
 241. See LYSANDER SPOONER, THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (Boston, Bela Marsh 1845). 
 242. See JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY (1849). The argument 
from birthright citizenship to racial equality predated the Revolution—it has its origins in the works of 
revolutionary thinker James Otis. James Otis, The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved, in THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: PRIMARY SOURCES 119, 122 (Bruce Frohnen ed., 2002) (“That the colonists, black and 
white, born here, are free born British subjects, and entitled to all the essential civil rights of such, is a 
truth . . . manifest . . . from the principles of the common law . . . .”). 
 243. YATES, supra note 240, at 37. 
 244. Id. at 36–37 (“In all the writers on public law there is one ancient and universal classification of the 
people of a country; all who are born within the jurisdiction of a State are natives, and all others are aliens. This 
classification grows out of the doctrine of natural allegiance, a tie created by birth.”). 
 245. See SPOONER, supra note 241, at 156 (“The constitution of the United States recognizes that all men 
are born free; for it recognizes the principle that natural birth in the country gives citizenship. . . . And no 
exception is made to the rule.”); TIFFANY, supra note 242, at 86–97 (“[U]pon every principles of reasoning, all 
colored persons, as well as others, who have been born within the jurisdiction of the United States, whether they 
have been deemed slaves, of freemen, are citizens thereof, and as such . . . entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of Citizenship.”). 
 246. MARTHA S. JONES, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 
(2018). 
 247. Id. at 64. 
 248. Citizenship, 10 Op. Att’y Gen. 382, 389 (1862) (emphasis added). 
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citizenship based on birth, explained the Baltimore abolitionist and suffragette 
Frances E.W. Harper, acknowledges that “we are all bound up together in one 
great bundle of humanity.”249 
We, finally, confirmed that the preceding examples of usage were standard 
by reviewing articles in the Library of Congress’s searchable “Chronicling 
America” database of American newspapers. We reviewed 200 unique 
newspaper pages published between 1855–60 and 1866–68 using the word 
“born” as a qualifier of “citizen.” We classified references to born citizens as 
references to human beings based on descriptions attributing to the citizens at 
issue behavior or characteristics limited to human beings, including parents, 
familial status, ethnicity, physical traits, military service, party registration, and 
voting.  
In 18.5% of the pages, the terms “born” and “citizen” were used generically 
in an indeterminate context. Every other page we examined employed the term 
“born” citizen to refer to real human beings. We could find no example of the 
use of either term in relation to corporations or other abstract objects, other than 
one article noting that corporations are not “natural born” citizens.250 
C.  “NATURALIZED” CITIZENS WERE NATURAL PERSONS  
The Citizenship Clause also defines “naturalized” persons as citizens of the 
United States and of the states in which they reside. Although “naturalized” was 
sometimes used figuratively,251 the word was always employed in antebellum 
discussions of citizenship to convey a legal status of “born” or natural persons. 
 
 249. FRANCES E.W. HARPER, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH NATIONAL WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONVENTION 
45–46 (1866); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 260 n.* 
(1998) (discussing how the Civil Rights Act of 1866 formed the backdrop for the Eleventh Women’s Rights 
Convention). Congress spent little time discussing the meaning of the term “born” in the Citizenship Clause 
(suggestive that the word, in context, had an obvious meaning). But see CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 
3032 (1866) (Sen. Henderson) (characterizing “born” persons as “born of . . . parents”). Proponents of the 
Amendment, or its precursor, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, embraced this sense when explaining the Clause’s 
effect. The Citizenship Clause and its statutory precursor would secure for African Americans the privileges and 
immunities of citizenship. These were equal “civil” or “personal” rights, which were in turn variously equated 
with “human rights,” the rights that “appertain to every free man,” or the “natural rights of man” that government 
was formed to protect and secure. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (Rep. Wilson) (“civil 
rights” are the “natural rights of man”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 344 (1866) (Sen. Wilson) (“We 
stand as the champions of human rights . . . .”); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474, 476 (1866) (Sen. 
Trumbull) (stating that the Civil Rights Act secures “natural liberty, so far as restrained by human laws . . . for 
the general advantage of the public”). For further discussion of the meaning of “men,” which was a term reserved 
for “human beings,” see infra note 268 and accompanying text; see also Marcantel, supra note 38, at 263 & 
n.259 (collecting additional evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers associated citizenship and 
human rights). 
 250. See “Who Are Disenfranchised?”, RAFTSMAN’S JOURNAL (Clearfield, Pa.), Oct. 4, 1865, 
https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/data/batches/pst_lasch_ver01/data/sn85054616/00212477813/1865100401/
0020.pdf (stating that a person is a citizen of the United States by “birth or naturalization” and “the word ‘citizen’ 
was well understood, as it is now understood, to mean a human being—a natural person . . . of whom allegiance 
is predicable”) (third column). 
 251. See, for example, Lord Mansfield’s opinion in Berens v. Rucker, in which he characterized the act of 
permitting a foreign ship to trade with all the privileges of a domestic ship as “naturaliz[ing]” the ship. Berens 
v. Rucker (1761) 96 Eng. Rep. 175, 176 (K.B.) (“The rule is, that if a neutral ship trade to a French colony, with 
all the privileges of a French ship, and is thus adopted and naturalized, it must be looked upon as a French 
ship . . . .”).  
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In this, usage again followed the pattern set in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. 
The eighteenth-century editions of Coke’s Institutes defined naturalization 
as a status conferred on “aliens,” or persons “born in a strange country” and 
therefore “out of the ligeance” of the King.252 In his Commentaries, Blackstone 
similarly defined “naturalization” exclusively as a status awarded to aliens.253 
“By [naturalization,]” he wrote, “an alien is put in exactly the same state as if he 
had been born in the king’s ligeance.”254 An “alien,” in turn, was “one born out 
of the King’s dominions.”255 
Similarly, Webster’s dictionary defined naturalization in its legal sense, as 
the “confer[ral] on an alien the rights and privileges of a native subject or citizen; 
to adopt foreigners into a nation or state, and place them in the condition of 
natural born subjects.”256 “Foreigners,” in turn, were “person[s] born in a foreign 
country, or without the country or jurisdiction of which one speaks.”257 Thus, 
“[a] naturalized person is a citizen; but we still call him a foreigner by birth.”258 
Antebellum treatises would define naturalization the same way. Thus 
William Alexander Duer’s textbook on American constitutional law (sometimes 
credited as the first of its kind) explained:  
The Constitution contains no definition of the character of a citizen; but the 
term is used in plain reference to the Common Law, which . . . in many 
instances must be resorted to as the interpreter of its meaning. . . . At the time 
the Constitution was adopted, the Citizens of each State, collectively, 
constituted the citizens of the United States; and were either native Citizens, 
or those born within the United States, or naturalized Citizens, or persons born 
elsewhere, but who, upon assuming the allegiance, had become entitled to, the 
privileges of native Citizens.259 
Similarly, the vast majority of antebellum naturalization acts “pre-
suppose[d] that all who are to be benefited by their provisions were born 
abroad.”260 And, in Dred Scott v. Sandford both Justice Taney, in his opinion for 
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the Court, and dissenter Justice Curtis agreed that naturalization was a power 
limited to altering the status of “persons born in a foreign country.”261 Wrote 
Curtis: 
It is not doubted that this is a power to prescribe a rule for the removal of the 
disabilities consequent on foreign birth. To hold that it extends further than 
this, would do violence to the meaning of the term naturalization, fixed in the 
common law, and in the minds of those who concurred in framing and 
adopting the Constitution. . . . [T]he only power expressly granted to Congress 
to legislate concerning citizenship, is confined to the removal of the 
disabilities of foreign birth.262 
The public debate over slavery was also concerned with “naturalization.” 
William Yates’ treatise on the rights of free blacks suggested that naturalization 
was a power limited to granting citizenship to the foreign born.263 That fact 
requires treating native born African Americans as “already citizens,” since, 
otherwise, an absurdity would result: since they are home born, and therefore 
not within the scope of the naturalization power, African Americans “[could] 
not be made [citizens] by Congress” and so would be “worse than foreigners.”264  
Attorney General Bates, in his opinion on the citizenship of free blacks, 
also defined “naturalization” the same way—by reference to the circumstances 
of actual birth. The naturalization power, he wrote, is power of 
“legal . . . adoption” of the “foreign born.”265 Citizens are thus either “home 
born” or “alien—foreign-born” who have, by process of law, been “naturalized,” 
or made in the eyes of the law equal to the “home born.”266  
Many abolitionists, however, denied that birth in a foreign jurisdiction was 
always a prerequisite. In debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
granted freed slaves the privileges and immunities of citizenship, opponents 
cited Justice Curtis for the proposition that Congress lacked the power to 
“naturalize” native born freed blacks, because they were not “foreign born.”267  
Senator Trumbull and his allies, following abolitionists like Spooner,268 
argued the naturalization power was not limited simply to the foreign born. 
However, they continued to describe the class of persons to whom naturalization 
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applied as human beings. Naturalization, said Senator Thayer, was properly 
defined as a power over either foreigners “born abroad” or those “born in this 
country”;269 or, alternatively, as the power to give to “a man, or any class of men, 
the same rights the same rights of citizenship which belong to a natural-born 
citizen of the country.”270 “Men”—the term used to describe the class to which 
naturalization is applicable¾was a term that, in the nineteenth century, 
described “members of the human race” or “mankind.”271  
And, again, examining the use of the term “naturalize” or “naturalization” 
in the context of discussions of citizenship in the Chronicling America database 
confirmed this pattern of usage. We reviewed 200 unique newspaper pages 
published between 1855–60 and 1866–68 using the word “naturalized” as a 
qualifier of “citizen.” We classified references to naturalized citizens as 
references to natural persons based on descriptions attributing to the citizens at 
issue behavior or characteristics limited to human beings, including parents, 
familial status, ethnicity, physical traits, military service, party registration, and 
voting. In 16% of the pages, the terms naturalized citizen was used generically 
in an indeterminate context. Every other page we examined employed the term 
“naturalized” citizen to refer to real human beings. We could find no uses of the 
term “naturalized” to refer corporations. 
* * * 
The upshot: By defining citizen using terms—birth and naturalization—
limited to natural persons, the Citizenship Clause did not expand the term 
“citizen” to encompass corporations. Article III citizens were natural persons in 
1787, and they remained so after passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
A few years after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice 
Curtis argued that corporations are not Article III citizens as an original 
matter.272 A decade earlier, John Codman Hurd had suggested that Article III 
uses the term “citizen” in a different sense, drawn from international law, that 
has nothing to do with the conferral of rights and immunities under domestic 
law. It is a term, he argued, for “belonging” to a state in the eyes of international 
law—one that encompasses corporations and other “legal persons” subject to a 
state’s “personal jurisdiction” by virtue of a domicile.273  
Justice Curtis’s claim is the correct one. At the two relevant fixation 
periods, 1787–88 and 1866–68, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that clauses 
employing the term “citizen” were limited to natural persons.  
In 1787–88, the public meaning of citizen communicated, at a minimum, 
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that the status holder was expected to have a solidaristic tie to the status-granting 
community, a tie which only real human beings can form. In 1787–88, 
citizenship thus had a sortal boundary—it was a term that did not extend beyond 
the set of human beings. 
The Fourteenth Amendment added monumentally important content to the 
meaning of “citizen” across the Constitution. It overturned Dred Scott, affirming 
the set of citizens is not restricted with regard to race—it is a term open to “all” 
human beings who meet its race-neutral definitional criteria. And, in the process, 
it shifted the conception of citizenship away from its original emphasis on a 
community of allegiance toward an understanding of citizenship as a community 
of equal human rights and equal human dignity.274 But because it defined 
citizenship in terms—“birth” and “naturalization”—reserved for human beings, 
it did not expand the set of citizens beyond the boundaries set down in 1787–88. 
Hurd’s new concept of Article III citizenship was an obscure specialist 
sense that developed between ratification of Article III and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. But that sense was not part of the word’s popular meaning and was 
never ratified by amendments to the Constitution’s text.  
“Citizen,” as the term was defined and used in the Constitution, is 
conceptually tied to humanity. The original public meaning of the word “citizen” 
communicated powerful normative ideas relating to human political 
relationships and human rights, but did not encompass abstract objects, like 
corporations. 
Recovering and implementing the original public meaning of “citizen” 
could have profound implications for contemporary constitutional doctrine. It 
also has interesting implications for bigger picture debates about originalism. A 
full exploration of those implications is beyond the scope of this Article, but in 
this conclusion, we will sketch some of the most likely possibilities. 
First, modern diversity doctrine, applied to corporations, cannot be squared 
with the original public meaning of Article III. Section (c) of the statutory grant 
of original diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) treats corporations as 
citizens of the states in which they are incorporated and in which they operate 
their “principal place of business.”275 This reflects Hurd’s conception of Article 
III citizens, not the text’s original meaning. 
Because as an original matter, corporation qua corporations are not Article 
III citizens, the current statutory grant of diversity jurisdiction exceeds 
Congress’s authority. Congress does not have the power to change the 
constitutional meaning of “citizen” through legislation; rather, the constitutional 
grant of diversity jurisdiction operates as a limit on Congress’s power to confer 
original subject-matter jurisdiction on “such inferior courts as the Congress may 
from time to time ordain and establish.”276 In other words, Section 1332(c), as it 
stands, is unconstitutional from an originalist perspective. 
This fact should, we note, also give living constitutionalists pause. This is 
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not a close case. To the extent that living constitutionalists give substantial (if 
not decisive) weight to the clear and unequivocal meaning of the constitutional 
text, there is a prima facie case against Section 1332(c). 
Perhaps corporate diversity jurisdiction can be salvaged by amending 
Section 1332(c). However, there is only one route such an amendment could 
take: the one charted in antebellum cases like Deveaux, where the Supreme 
Court allowed corporations to access the federal diversity docket based on the 
citizenship of their shareholders. To save corporate diversity jurisdiction, an 
amended version of Section 1332(c) would need to rely on the concept of 
“minimum diversity” by conferring jurisdiction over corporations when at least 
one shareholder of a corporation is a citizen of a state other that the state of 
which the opposing party is a citizen.277 This, in turn, would require corporate 
litigants to determine whether shareholders are United States citizens and their 
states of domicile in order to invoke federal diversity jurisdiction. Of course, 
Section 1332(c) does not require such a determination; it confers diversity 
jurisdiction irrespective of the citizenship of shareholders. 
It is, though, far from clear this fix is consistent with the original meaning 
of the diversity clause. Whether it passes originalist muster turns on the original 
meaning of the phrase “controversies between” citizens. If the parties “between” 
whom “controversies” subsisted were those over whom the court exercises in 
personam jurisdiction, then shareholders would usually not qualify as Article III 
parties in suits by or against their corporations. In that case, this attempted fix 
would be just as unconstitutional from an originalist perspective as the current 
version of Section 1332(c). An inquiry into the persons “between” whom Article 
III “controversies” subsist is, though, a subject for future research. 
Another potential problem with salvaging diversity jurisdiction over 
corporations on the basis of shareholder citizenship is that the strategy assumes 
the complete diversity rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss278 is only a statutory rule, 
not a constitutional requirement. Again, this topic is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but we note that Justice Marshall’s very concise opinion in Strawbridge 
says nothing about the relationship between the meaning of the diversity statute 
and the almost identically worded constitutional provision.279 The supposition 
that the Strawbridge rule is not constitutional does not, as far as we are aware, 
seem to be grounded in a rigorous investigation of the original public meaning 
of Article III. Rather, it seems to us to be an assumption made by contemporary 
courts and commentators who assumed a nonoriginalist framework. 
It might be argued that the unconstitutionality of corporate diversity 
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jurisdiction is not a matter of great consequence. If these cases cannot be heard 
in federal court, there will always be a state court forum available. State courts 
are courts of general subject-matter jurisdiction, and some state court will have 
jurisdiction over any corporation that is incorporated in one of the United States. 
But this argument ignores the importance of forum shopping, especially in cases 
in which a corporation is the defendant.280 It may well be the case that federal 
courts systematically favor corporate defendants represented by Big Law over 
individual plaintiffs represented by local plaintiff’s lawyers—although the 
investigation of that empirical claim is beyond the scope of this Article. We 
believe it is very likely that corporate diversity jurisdiction has important 
consequences, and hence that the question whether such jurisdiction is 
constitutional is not trivial or insignificant. 
The Article’s findings are also important for bigger picture debates about 
originalism. First, the findings help shore up originalism against a common 
attack: that it is just a cover for “conservative” preferences. In recent years, 
progressives have often fought to preserve state control over corporate litigation, 
while business conservatives have generally favored expanding federal power 
over corporate litigation, at states’ expense, through enactments like the Class 
Action Fairness Act. By complicating the scope of corporate diversity 
jurisdiction, the results illustrate that originalism is a project that is orthogonal 
to any one set of partisan preferences. 
On the other hand, the project also shows how originalism, or at least non-
“faint-hearted” versions, would, if put in the practice, lead to results that unsettle 
major features of what might be called the practical or workaday constitution, of 
which diversity jurisdiction is a major part. This may lend fuel to critics’ 
complaints that originalism is too impractical to implement. Stout-hearted 
originalists will need to grapple with what the findings here mean for their 
approach to originalism as a normative matter. 
Faint-hearted originalists who happily adhere to long-settled precedent, by 
contrast, won’t face this problem—and will even find the results here help 
rationalize some otherwise mysterious features of current precedent. Modern 
doctrine, for example, directs that statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction 
should be construed narrowly—what has sometimes been termed the Court’s 
“anti-jurisdictional canon.” Many have questioned merits of the canon.281 But, 
by raising doubts about the constitutionality of corporate diversity jurisdiction, 
this Article tees up the possibility that the canon might be rationalized as a 
“second-best” strategy, or compensating adjustment, for entrenched 
underenforcement of Article III limits on diversity jurisdiction.  
These are just some of the further inquiries that flow from the simple but 
important fact that corporations’ claim to state citizenship finds no support in 
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the Constitution’s original meaning. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
